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INTRODUCTION
When one thinks about discrimination, blatant acts or bad motives
usually come to mind. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”) protects against this type of intentional discrimination in the
1
workplace through its disparate treatment provision. Title VII also,
however, imposes liability even in situations where the employer acts
2
without bad intentions. An employer may be liable simply because
one group passes a neutral promotion test or meets a hiring
qualification at a substantially higher rate than other groups, even
when the selection criterion applies to everyone and is not devised to
1. Congress enacted section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
provide protections against employment discrimination by providing as follows:
(a) Employer Practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employments, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (emphasis added).
2. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (stating that even
good intentions are not a defense when an employer’s selection criteria that are not
job related cause an adverse effect).
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3

disadvantage one group over another. Nevertheless, if an employer’s
neutral employment practice causes a disproportionate impact on a
racial group or other protected class, it is a prima facie violation of
4
Title VII’s disparate impact provision. The employer must defend
the charge by showing that the employment practice is job related
5
and a business necessity. Mounting a defense may involve validating
6
the test or selection criterion, which can cost $100,000–$400,000.
Even after an employer validates a business practice, the employer
may still be liable if there are other equally effective alternatives that
7
have less adverse effect.
Consequently, the employer may be concerned about the racial
composition of its employees and may make race-conscious
employment decisions to avoid disparate impact liability. To the
extent that employers feel induced by the disparate impact provision
to make such decisions, it is possible that the provision violates the
Equal Protection Clause because it encourages employers to act on
the basis of race.
8
In Ricci v. DeStefano, the city of New Haven faced this very
predicament and decided to void a promotion test given to
9
firefighters because it was concerned about disparate impact liability.
A disproportionate number of African Americans and Hispanics who
10
took the test failed. Under the four-fifths rule, a Guideline enforced
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
disparate impact exists when the selection or pass rate of one group is
11
less than eighty percent of the most successful group.
Had the
minority firefighters sued, they would have been able to show a prima
12
facie case of disparate impact based simply on the numbers. This
13
potential litigation led the city to discard the test results.
Consequently, Caucasian firefighters and a Hispanic firefighter who
3. See id. at 431–32 (discussing the lack of discriminatory intent in designing
tests or criteria for promotion).
4. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(B)(ii); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
6. See infra note 164 (discussing costs of validating selection criteria).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
8. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
9. Id. at 2664.
10. Id. at 2677–78.
11. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(2010).
12. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677–78. On the lieutenant examination, the pass rate for
each racial group was the following: 58.1 percent for Caucasians, 31.6 percent for
African Americans, and 20 percent for Hispanics. Id. at 2678. On the captain
examination, the pass rate for Caucasians was 64 percent and for Hispanics and
African Americans was 37.5 percent. Id.
13. Id. at 2664.
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passed the test, and would likely have been promoted, sued. These
plaintiffs alleged that the city’s action violated Title VII’s disparate
15
treatment provision and the Equal Protection Clause.
In Ricci, the Court resolved the disparate treatment issue under
16
Title VII but did not address whether the disparate impact provision
17
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Scalia observed that the
Supreme Court’s resolution “merely postpone[d] the evil day on
which the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to
what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee
18
of equal protection? The question is not an easy one.”
This Article completes the initial inquiry I embarked upon to
19
answer this difficult question. In my prior work, I identified and
examined six compelling interests that might be asserted to justify the
disparate impact provision’s racial classifications under an Equal
Protection Clause challenge:
remedying past discrimination,
smoking out discrimination (intentional or unconscious), obtaining
the benefits of diversity, providing role models, satisfying an
operational need, and providing equal employment opportunity by
20
removing barriers.
I concluded that removing barriers to
employment might provide the strongest defense for the disparate
21
impact provision. This Article will explore whether the disparate
impact provision’s use of racial classifications is narrowly tailored to
achieve these compelling interests. Although Title VII protects
employees from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2681 (holding that the city needed to show a “strong basis in evidence”
that its selection process would cause a potential disparate impact violation, which
the city lacked).
17. The Court stated:
Our statutory holding does not address the constitutionality of the measures
taken here in purported compliance with Title VII. We also do not hold that
meeting the strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal
Protection Clause in a future case.
As we explain below, because
respondents have not met their burden under Title VII, we need not decide
whether a legitimate fear of disparate impact is ever sufficient to justify
discriminatory treatment under the Constitution.
Id. at 2676.
18. Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. See Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision
and the Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J.
1, 8(2010).
20. See id. at 8–9.
21. See id. at 88 (discussing the removal of barriers as a compelling interest
because it affords people economic liberty and equality).
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sex, or national origin, this Article focuses on racial classifications,
and a discussion of other groups is beyond its scope.
Commentators have focused on other constitutional issues raised
22
by the disparate impact provision, but none have explored this
particular constitutional inquiry—whether the disparate impact
provision is narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny should “the evil
day” come when an Equal Protection Clause challenge is made. In
fact, little scholarship has been written about narrow tailoring
23
generally.
It is surprising that there is a dearth of scholarship discussing
narrow tailoring given its significance in the evaluation of
governmental actions that affect equal protection and individual
24
rights. It is said that strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in
25
fact,” but a review of the Supreme Court’s equal protection cases
reveals that perhaps strict scrutiny is fatal because of narrow tailoring.
When governmental use of racial classifications is challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause, strict scrutiny requires that the
government have a compelling purpose and that the racial
26
classifications be narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose. The
asserted governmental purpose may either be remedial (to remedy
past discrimination) or nonremedial (for some purpose other than to
remedy past discrimination). The narrow tailoring requirement has
been particularly fatal in cases involving nonremedial interests.
27
28
Korematsu v. United States and Grutter v. Bollinger are among the few

22. Much scholarship has been written about the validity of laws that prohibit
disparate impact, without a showing of intent, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Commerce Clause, and about whether neutral state action that
has a discriminatory effect but lacks a discriminatory intent violates the Equal
Protection Clause. The latter point was raised by Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
235, 237, 238–39 (1976). See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 494–95 (2003) (discussing the Court’s treatment
of statutory disparate impact standards in Washington v. Davis).
23. See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 518 (2007) (discussing how Grutter v. Bollinger
and Gratz v. Bollinger changed the narrow tailoring analysis); Ian Ayres, Narrow
Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1782 (1996) (considering the types of affirmative
action programs that would pass the narrow tailoring requirement).
24. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (establishing
that local, state, or federal government action that implicates rights bestowed by the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause or Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause will be reviewed with strict scrutiny).
25. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
26. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
27. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (invoking national security concerns for the
government’s racial classifications during the internment of Japanese Americans).
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cases involving nonremedial interests to survive strict scrutiny’s
requirement for narrow tailoring, but in light of the universal
29
condemnation of Korematsu, Grutter is the more viable example.
This Article explores whether the disparate impact provision can
survive strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement by examining
30
the factors considered by the Court in evaluating this requirement.
This Article begins by briefly tracing the development of the
disparate impact provision and the four-fifths rule in Part I and
explaining how the two are related. Part II discusses the significance
of narrow tailoring and the factors used to evaluate whether the
narrowly tailored requirement is met.
In Part III, this Article examines the first factor: whether the
enforcement of the four-fifths rule operates like a quota and draws a
31
line on the basis of race, or operates as a permissible goal, like in
Grutter v. Bollinger. Part III also considers whether Grutter’s “critical
mass” approach, which did not refer to any specified number, is
32
applicable to the disparate impact provision. This Part concludes
that while the law school in Grutter may assess the attainment of
diversity without reference to a defined number of minorities, the
critical mass approach is inapplicable because the EEOC must refer
to some sort of threshold to maintain uniformity in enforcing the
disparate impact provision. Additionally, the EEOC must refer to a
predetermined number or ratio as to what constitutes disparate
impact in order to provide notice and due process to employers.
Part IV considers the factors of individualized consideration and
flexibility. If the disparate impact provision functions as a quota, it is
unlikely to afford flexibility or individualized consideration. Whether
28. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (invoking an interest in diversity for the law school’s
race-conscious admissions program).
29. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Court . . . nonetheless yielded a pass for an odious, gravely injurious racial
classification. . . . Such a classification, history and precedent instruct, properly ranks
as prohibited.”); Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“[Korematsu] is now widely regarded as a black mark on our constitutional
jurisprudence.”); Jonathan M. Justl, Note, Disastrously Misunderstood: Judicial Deference
in the Japanese-American Cases, 119 YALE L.J. 270, 278 n.34 (2009) (citing David Cole,
Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 993 (2002)) (pointing out that by 2002, eight
Supreme Court Justices have stated that Korematsu was incorrectly decided).
30. I acknowledge that the application of the narrowly tailored requirement is
fact specific, and this Article will explore the question using general facts derived
from the Supreme Court’s precedent. This Article does not make a normative
argument regarding whether the cases were rightly decided, but rather, accepts the
Court’s holdings as a basis for analysis.
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90 (rejecting set-aside program because it was “a line
drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status”).
32. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–36 (2003) (accepting the school’s concept of “critical
mass” as narrowly tailored to achieve diversity).
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a race-conscious program is narrowly tailored is dependent upon
whether race is used as the decisive factor and whether case-by-case
considerations are possible.
Part V examines the scope and duration of the disparate impact
provision. The reasonableness of a program’s scope depends upon
its ability to encompass only similarly situated persons for purposes of
the program and may be affected by the overinclusion or
underinclusion of people. Part V discusses whether the disparate
impact provision’s probability for error would render it
underinclusive or overinclusive and whether the provision excludes
white males from asserting disparate impact claims, thereby making it
underinclusive. Part VI explores whether the provision’s racial
classifications are reasonable in duration or seek to maintain racial
balance.
Part VII evaluates the final factor of whether the disparate impact
provision’s racial classifications are necessary after consideration of
race-neutral alternatives and whether there are race-neutral means to
achieve the compelling purposes previously identified. Part VIII
assesses the likelihood of the disparate impact provision’s survival,
taking in consideration the totality of the narrow tailoring factors.
This Article concludes that the disparate impact provision is
unlikely to pass the narrowly tailored requirement and risks being
invalidated on “the evil day” when the provision is challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause.
I.

EVOLUTION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY AND PROVISION
AND THE FOUR-FIFTHS RULE
A. The Beginnings of Disparate Impact Theory in the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court first adopted the disparate impact theory in
33
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., in which the Court considered the breadth
34
of Title VII’s protection against discrimination.
In Griggs, an
employer required employees seeking jobs or promotions to have a
35
high school diploma and to pass an intelligence test.
These
requirements were applied equally to Caucasians and African
36
37
Americans but adversely affected African Americans. The Court
invalidated the employer’s practices, concluding that the Civil Rights
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 430–31.
Id. at 427–28.
Id. at 429.
Id.
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Act of 1964 prohibited “not only overt discrimination but also
38
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”
Thus, employers who act with good or non-discriminatory intent must
nevertheless justify employment practices that have an adverse effect
39
by showing a business necessity related to job performance.
B. Congress’s Passage of the Disparate Impact Provision
After Griggs, Congress codified disparate impact liability in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 provides:
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under this subchapter only if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment
practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative
40
employment practice.

Section 703(k)(1) encompasses the same principles of disparate
impact articulated in Griggs by affording employers an opportunity to
defend their employment practice by showing that the practice is job
41
related and consistent with business necessity.
Additionally, § 703
provides plaintiffs an opportunity at the surrebuttal stage to show that
42
the employer refused to use less adverse alternatives. An employer’s
refusal to use such options will render it liable under the disparate
impact provision, even if the employer’s practice is job related and
43
consistent with a business necessity.
C. The Four-Fifths Rule
44

The EEOC is charged with enforcing Title VII.
In 1978, the
EEOC promulgated the four-fifths rule as part of its Guidelines on

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 431.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006).
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
Id. § 2000e-2(d)(1)(A).
Id. § 2000e-5(a).
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45

Employee Selection Procedures that were designed to assist with
compliance with federal law prohibiting discrimination and to
“provide a framework for determining the proper use of tests and
46
other selection procedures.” The four-fifths rule has become an
important rule because a violation of the rule is a prima facie case of
47
The four-fifths rule or eighty percent rule
disparate impact.
provides as follows:
Adverse impact and the “four-fifths rule.” A selection rate for any
race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or
eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as
evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will
generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as
48
evidence of adverse impact.
49

The Supreme Court has not yet reviewed the Guidelines but has
made varying statements regarding the deference it accords to the
Guidelines generally.
Griggs accorded the Guidelines “great
50
deference,” explaining that “[s]ince the Act and its legislative history
support the Commission’s construction, this affords good reason to
51
treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.” Albemarle
52
53
Paper Co. v. Moody followed the deference given in Griggs, opining

45. Jacob Van Bowen, Jr. & C. Allen Riggins, A Technical Look at the Eighty Per Cent
Rule as Applied to Employee Selection Procedures, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 648 (1978).
46. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Federal Register
38290, 38296 (Aug. 25, 1978).
47. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673, 2677–78 (2009)(“Under the
disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by showing that
an employer uses ‘a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)). The Supreme Court has stated that “[u]less and until the
defendant [employer] pleads and proves a business-necessity defense, the plaintiff
wins simply by showing the stated elements” of disparate impact. Lewis v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010). The four-fifths rule is an articulation of when
the stated elements of disparate impact has been met.
48. The four-fifths rule also considers situations in which a ratio higher or lower
than four-fifths may constitute evidence of adverse impact. EEOC Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010). See Marion Gross
Sobol & Charles J. Ellard, Measures of Employment Discrimination: A Statistical
Alternative to the Four-Fifths Rule, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 381, 388–91 (1988) for an
explanation of how to compute disparities using the four-fifths rule.
49. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1319 (1987).
50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971).
51. Id. at 434.
52. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
53. Id. at 431 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433–34); see also Dean Booth & James L.
Mackay, Legal Constraints on Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law,
29 EMORY L.J. 121, 128 (1980) (stating that Albemarle “represents the ‘high-water
mark’ of deference to the 1970 Guidelines”).
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that “[t]he EEOC Guidelines are not administrative regulations[]
promulgated pursuant to formal procedures established by the
Congress.
But . . . they do constitute ‘[t]he administrative
54
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency.’” Additionally, in
Ricci, the Court recognized the role of the Guidelines in
55
implementing the disparate impact provision.
56
Since the promulgation of the four-fifths rule in 1978, the
Supreme Court has not explicitly approved or rejected this particular
57
rule. The Court in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust viewed the
four-fifths rule as “not provid[ing] more than a rule of thumb for the
58
59
courts.”
In United States v. Paradise, the Court did not directly
endorse the four-fifths rule but acknowledged that the parties agreed
to use the four-fifths rule to determine the adverse effect of the
60
selection procedure. The Court also provided an illustration of the
61
application of the four-fifths rule through an example.
62
In Connecticut v. Teal, the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the
four-fifths rule by recognizing the district court’s uncontested finding
63
that the examination failed the four-fifths rule. The Court provided
a more direct discussion regarding the four-fifths rule in Ricci v.
DeStefano, where the Court applied the rule and concluded that

54. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971)).
55. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009) (citing EEOC Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)(2008)) (applying the fourfifths rule).
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, stated, “Recognizing EEOC’s
‘enforcement responsibilities’ under Title VII, we have previously accorded the
Commission’s position respectful consideration.” Id. at 2699–700 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
The circuit courts, however, “have accorded them a limited degree of deference.
The circuit courts have generally accepted the guidelines as expert advice on
technical issues, but not as binding authority on questions of statutory
interpretations.” Rutherglen, supra note 49, at 1319.
56. Van Bowen & Riggins, supra note 45, at 648. In addition to the EEOC, the
Department of Justice, the Civil Service Commission, and the Department of Labor
used the four-fifths rule to carry out their respective enforcement charges. Id. at
648–49.
57. 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 995 n.3.
59. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 159.
61. Id. at 159 n.10 (“In other words, if 60% of the white troopers who take a
promotion test pass it, then 48% of the black troopers to whom it is administered
must pass.”).
62. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
63. Id. at 444 n.4; Paul Meier et al., What Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics,
Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 139, 143
(stating that the Supreme Court had implicitly approved the eighty percent rule
when it noted that the petitioners did not contest the lower court’s finding of
disparate impact).
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“[t]he pass rates of minorities . . . fall well below the 80-percent
standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact
64
provision of Title VII.”
Additionally, there is little agreement among commentators as to
the deference that should be accorded to the Guidelines. One
commentator has argued “Congress did not intend the courts to
65
defer [to] the EEOC rulings.” Congress empowered the EEOC to
investigate charges of employer discrimination and determine
whether a reasonable basis exists for the charges, but not to
66
determine the existence of discrimination.
Another commentator, however, has concluded that the
67
Guidelines should be viewed as “more than informal.” According to
this view, the courts have erroneously interpreted the Guidelines as
68
being entitled to deference but not binding. As the argument goes,
this interpretation is a mistake because the EEOC promulgated the
Guidelines with the participation of agencies empowered with
69
substantive rulemaking authority.
Ultimately, the argument
concludes that the Guidelines are binding because Chevron, U.S.A.,
70
Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. accords greater weight
71
to agency statements resulting from the rulemaking process.
Despite the disagreement among commentators and inconclusive
remarks by the Court, the four-fifths rule remains critical in the
determination of disparate impact liability. Therefore, it is necessary
that this Article considers how the application of the four-fifths rule
affects the factors used in evaluating the narrowly tailored
requirement.
II. NARROW TAILORING
When the government implements racially based policies, its
72
policies are reviewed under strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires

64. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009).
65. Michael Evan Gold, Griggs’ Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of
the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for
Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 485 (1985).
66. Id. at 485–86.
67. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition IV: Affirmation of Affirmative Action
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 903, 910 (1993).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
71. Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 910.
72. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny . . . .”).
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that racial classifications be necessary to achieve a compelling
73
governmental purpose. Strict scrutiny serves the following purposes:
[It] “smoke[s] out” illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use
of a highly suspect tool . . . [and] ensures that the means chosen
“fit” this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate
74
racial prejudice or stereotype.

Narrow tailoring is the component of strict scrutiny that ensures
75
“the means chosen ‘fit’ [the] compelling goal.”
The Court has
examined a number of factors in determining whether governmental
76
77
racial classifications are narrowly tailored : the use of quotas, the
78
79
flexibility of the program, the duration of the relief, the scope of
80
81
the program, individualized considerations, and the necessity of
82
the program compared with the efficacy of race neutral alternatives.
73. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (explaining that all
restrictions based on racial classification are suspect unless justified by public
necessity).
74. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
75. Id.
76. See generally Ayres & Foster, supra note 23 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
approach to narrow tailoring after two recent decisions); Michael K. Fridkin,
The Permissibility of Non-Remedial Justification for Racial Preferences in Public Contracting,
24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 509, 519 (2004) (discussing the narrow tailoring issue after
Croson).
77. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477, 485, 505
(1989) (invalidating a program that set aside thirty percent of contract-award value
to Minority Business Enterprises); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
305, 320 (1978) (invalidating medical school’s admissions program that set aside
sixteen seats for underrepresented minorities).
78. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
79. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (“Proper findings in this regard are necessary to
define both the scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its
effects. Such findings also serve to assure all citizens that the deviation from the
norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a
measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself.”); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171.
80. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (“The gross overinclusiveness of Richmond’s racial
preference strongly impugns the city’s claim of remedial motivation.”).
81. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“As Justice Powell made
clear in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a
flexible, nonmechanical way.”); Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (“Based upon proper
findings, such programs are less problematic from an equal protection standpoint
because they treat all candidates individually, rather than making the color of an
applicant’s skin the sole relevant consideration.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978) (“The denial to respondent of this right to
individualized consideration without regard to his race is the principal evil of
petitioner’s special admissions program.”).
82. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237–38 (1995)
(pointing out that the circuit court failed to “address the question of narrow tailoring
in terms of our strict scrutiny cases, by asking, for example, whether there was any
consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business
participation in government contracting” (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 507) (internal
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Because “[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental
83
action under the Equal Protection Clause,” evaluation of the factors
for narrow tailoring in some instances will depend on the compelling
purpose asserted.
Whether the disparate impact provision must be narrowly tailored
depends upon whether it is subject to strict scrutiny review.
Consequently, because racial classifications may violate the Equal
Protection Clause, a preliminary determination of whether the
disparate impact provision implicates racial classifications is
necessary. Relying on Ricci, this Article assumes that Title VII’s
disparate impact provision uses racial classifications. In Ricci, the
Court characterized the city’s action as “express, race-based
84
decisionmaking” because the city voided the examination scores as a
85
The Court
result of “the statistical disparity based on race.”
explained that “the City rejected the test results because too many
whites and not enough minorities would be promoted were the lists
86
to be certified.” Therefore, this Article proceeds on the premise
that the disparate impact provision uses racial classifications because
it induces employers to consider race when making employment
87
decisions, triggering strict scrutiny.

quotations omitted)); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (“In determining whether raceconscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several factors, including the
necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies . . . .”); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“The term
‘narrowly tailored,’ . . . has acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as
commentators have indicated, the term may be used to require consideration of
whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as
Professor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must ‘fit’ with greater precision
than any alternative means.” (citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 n.26 (1974))).
Another factor that the Court has considered is whether the use of racial
classifications “unduly harms members of any racial group.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
Discussion of this factor is beyond the scope of this Article because it is not directly
applicable to the disparate impact provision.
83. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
84. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009).
85. Id.
86. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
87. State action exists because Congress is requiring employers to act in a certain
way. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–16 (1989) (holding that
regulations that authorized, but did not require, employers to administer blood and
urine tests constituted state action because the government encouraged this
practice).
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III. QUOTA OR GOAL: LINE DRAWING, A NUMBERS GAME, OR A
MATTER OF SEMANTICS?
The use of quotas is one factor in determining whether the
disparate impact provision’s use of racial classifications is narrowly
tailored. The Court’s treatment of quotas varies depending on
whether there is a remedial need for racial classifications. In cases
involving a need to remedy past discrimination, the Court has been
88
more accepting of quotas. On the other hand, in the absence of a
remedial need, the Court has generally rejected quotas but has
89
permitted goals.
This Part first provides a brief legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and its 1991 amendment codifying the disparate impact
provision. This Part also explores whether the disparate impact
provision can be properly characterized as a quota or a permissible
goal in order to determine if the provision is narrowly tailored. The
analysis proceeds by accepting the Court’s jurisprudence regarding
quotas because a normative discussion of quotas is beyond the scope
of this Article.
A. Brief Legislative History Showing Apprehension of Quotas
Legislative history reveals that, prior to the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, critics were concerned that the Act would require
90
quotas. “[M]any opponents of Title VII argued that an employer
could be found guilty of discrimination under the statute simply
88. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (“It is now well
established that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ
racial classifications essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic groups
subject to discrimination.”); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 479 (1986) (emphasizing the measure’s automatic termination
once the remedial need ends); Richard L. Barnes, Quotas as Satin-lined Traps, 29 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 865, 867 (1995) (“Judicially ordered quotas continue to have a place in
remedying discrimination . . . .”); Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality
Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle,
31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 363–64 (1983) (“Indeed, judicially imposed quotas designed to
remedy unlawful discrimination and affirmative action quotas voluntarily instituted
by employers to serve as insulation from possible Title VII liability are commonplace
and have generally fared well under attack in litigation.”).
89. C.f. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003) (discussing the difficulty
in classifying measures as remedial or illegitimate); City of Richmond v. Croson,
488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (emphasizing the impossibility of determining whether the
measure at issue was remedial); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310
(1978) (explaining that a measure with without a remedial purpose was unjustified
because it imposed disadvantages on persons who bore no responsibility for the
harms suffered by the measure’s beneficiaries).
90. See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 453–65 (describing the congressional
debates surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and tracing the Act’s development);
Gold, supra note 65, at 503–07.
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because of a racial imbalance in his work force, and would be
compelled to implement racial ‘quotas’ to avoid being charged with
91
liability.” Similar objections to quotas resurfaced during the passage
92
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
“[C]ounsel to three of the key
Senate sponsors” revealed that the disparate impact provision of the
proposed Act triggered the quota objection because the provision
attempted to codify both liability for unintentional discrimination
93
and the business necessity defense.
Senator Orin Hatch, for example, expressed his concerns:
[W]hat kind of a society do we really wish to establish? . . . [I]s it a
society that . . . requires every job in America to match perfectly the
numerical mix of the surrounding, relevant labor pool; a society
94
where every employment policy is governed by numerical quotas?

Ultimately, the fear of quotas led President George H. W. Bush to
95
veto the Civil Rights Act of 1990. President Bush stated, “Primarily
through provisions governing cases in which employment practices
are alleged to have unintentionally caused the disproportionate
exclusion of members of certain groups, the [1990 Act] creates
powerful incentives for employers to adopt hiring and promotion
96
quotas.”

91. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 463.
92. For discussions of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see
generally Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994); Andrew M. Dansicker, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing:
Affirmative Action, Disparate Impact, Quotas and the Civil Rights Act, 25 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 1 (1991); Gary A. Moore & Michael K. Braswell, “Quotas” and the
Codification of the Disparate Impact Theory: What Did Griggs Really Say and Not Say?,
55 ALB. L. REV. 459, 472–79 (1991).
For an insider’s perspective see C. Boyden Gray, Disparate Impact: History and
Consequences, 54 LA. L. REV. 1487, 1491 (1994); Peter M. Leibold et al., Civil Rights Act
of 1991: Race to the Finish—Civil Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in 1991, 45
RUTGERS L. REV. 1043 (1993). Peter Leibold, Stephen Sola, and Reginald Jones
“were intimately involved in the negotiations surrounding the 1991 bill” as counsel to
senators. Id. at 1043. C. Boyden Gray played a key role during the negotiations of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by serving as Counsel to the President of the United
States. Gray, supra, at 1487.
93. Leibold et al., supra note 92, at 1043–44.
94. Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” a Codification
of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
287, 288 n.5 (1993) (quoting 136 CONG. REC. 29,527 (1990) (statement of Sen.
Hatch)).
95. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The 1991 Civil Rights Act: A Constitutional, Statutory, and
Philosophical Enigma, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 913–14 (1993) (discussing the
failure of the 1990 Act).
96. Id. at 913–14 (quoting Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval
the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1437, 1438 (Oct. 22, 1990)).
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Interestingly, the Democrats in both the House of Representatives
97
and Senate had adopted anti-quota language in the 1990 bill. Later,
98
as a result of compromise, the anti-quota language was deleted.
Senator Dole and the President explained that the anti-quota
language was omitted because it was unnecessary, as “the bill was not
99
a quota bill at all.” In November 1991, after a tumultuous two-year
100
battle, the President signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
B. The Court’s Treatment of Quotas for Non-Remedial Need
Except for Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court has invalidated most cases
involving governmental racial classifications for nonremedial need,
purposes other than remedying past discrimination, under strict
scrutiny’s narrowly tailored prong. In Regents of the University of
101
California v. Bakke the Supreme Court invalidated a medical school’s
admissions program, which set aside sixteen out of one hundred seats
102
in its entering class for minorities. Although the Court recognized
that the medical school’s goal of advancing diversity was a compelling
103
interest, the Court held that the program was not narrowly
104
tailored.
In its defense, the medical school attempted to distinguish its
program from a quota. A quota, according to the medical school, is
“a requirement which must be met but can never be exceeded,
105
regardless of the quality of the minority applicants.”
The medical
school argued that its admissions process was not a quota because
there was “no ‘floor’ under the total number of minority students
admitted; completely unqualified students [would] not be admitted
simply to meet a ‘quota.’ Neither [was] there a ‘ceiling,’ since an
unlimited number could be admitted through the general admissions
106
process.”
The Court rejected this “semantic distinction” because sixteen seats
were reserved for minority applicants without competition from white
107
applicants.
White applicants could vie only for eighty-four seats
97. See Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 914 (discussing the disappearance of the
anti-quota language adopted by both houses of Congress).
98. Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 914.
99. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
100. Leibold et al., supra note 92, at 1043.
101. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
102. Id. at 289.
103. Id. at 314.
104. Id. at 320.
105. Id. at 288 n.26.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 289.

NGOV.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

2/24/2011 5:39 PM

WHEN THE “EVIL DAY” COMES

551
108

while minorities were able to compete for all one hundred seats.
The Court concluded, “[w]hether this limitation is described as a
quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic
109
status.”
The Court, however, later found the distinction between a quota
110
In Grutter, the Court upheld a law school’s
and a goal significant.
admissions program that considered race as one factor to advance the
school’s objective of attaining a “critical mass” of diverse students in
111
its entering class.
The Court declared that “[t]o be narrowly
tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota
system” and validated the law school’s program because it did not rely
112
on a rigid quota. As the Court defined:
[A] quota is a program in which a certain fixed number or
proportion of opportunities are reserved exclusively for certain
minority groups. Quotas impose a fixed number or percentage
which must be attained, or which cannot be exceeded, and insulate
the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the
113
available seats.

In contrast, “a permissible goal requires only a good-faith effort to
come within a range demarcated by the goal itself, and permits
consideration of race as a plus factor in any given case while still
ensuring that each candidate competes with all other qualified
114
applicants.”
Ultimately, the Court decided that the admissions
115
program fell within a permissible goal.
116
Additionally, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Court
invalidated a program that required contractors who were awarded
city contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the award to
117
Minority Business Enterprises. The city could not show a remedial

108. Id.
109. Id. The Court compared the medical school’s program to Harvard’s,
pointing out that “[i]n Harvard College admissions the Committee did not set targetquotas for the number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physicists or
Californians to be admitted in a given year.” Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
By implication, the Court seemed to view the program in Bakke as a quota.
110. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335–36 (2003).
111. See id. at 318 (defining critical mass as “‘meaningful numbers’ or
‘meaningful representation,’ which [the school] understood to mean a number that
encourages underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and
not feel isolated”).
112. Id. at 334.
113. Id. at 335 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
114. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
115. See id. at 335–36 (“The Law School’s goal of attaining a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota.”).
116. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
117. Id. at 477, 485–86.
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need for the program because there was no evidence of past
118
The Court concluded that the thirty
discrimination by the city.
119
percent figure was a “rigid racial quota” that was not narrowly
tailored because race neutral alternatives were available and it
unrealistically assumed that minorities will select a particular job in
120
proportion to their representation in the local population.
C. The Court’s Treatment of Quotas for Remedial Need
Quotas designed to remedy past discrimination have had greater
success in meeting the narrow tailoring requirement. For example,
121
in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n v. EEOC,
(“Sheet Metal Workers”) the Court upheld a “membership goal”
imposed as remedial relief for prior union discrimination against
122
African Americans as being narrowly tailored.
Due to the union’s
“long and persistent pattern of discrimination” that had “consistently
123
and egregiously violated Title VII,” the district court established a
124
twenty-nine percent non-white membership goal.
The Court
concluded that the goal was necessary to redress the “lingering effects
125
of past discrimination.”
The flexibility of the goal, evidenced by the district court’s
adjustments in response to changes in the union, was another
126
persuasive factor in Sheet Metal Workers. The Court highlighted that
the district court’s flexibility in adjusting the deadline for achieving
the membership goal was evidence that the goal was not a device for
attaining and maintaining racial balance, but “rather [w]as a bench
mark against which the court could gauge [the union’s] efforts to
127
remedy past discrimination.” Additionally, the temporary nature of
the goal—that the program would end as soon as the union achieved

118. Id. at 480.
119. Id. at 499.
120. Id. at 507.
121. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
122. Id. at 476–77. The court ordered goal in Sheet Metal Workers survived
challenges under equal protection and Title VII. See id. at 479–80 (stating that
petitioners raised a claim under the “equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment”).
123. Id. at 433.
124. Id. at 432.
125. Id. at 477. The Court did not review the appropriateness of the twenty-nine
percent figure because that figure had been set for at least ten years, the court of
appeals had affirmed that figure twice before, and the parties did not raise this
particular issue for the Court’s review. Id. at 441.
126. Id. at 477–78.
127. Id.
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the sought after membership—was significant in the Court’s analysis
128
of whether the goal was narrowly tailored.
129
In United States v. Paradise, the Court upheld another “goal”
intended to redress past discrimination against African Americans by
130
the Alabama Department of Public Safety.
The district court
ordered the hiring of one African American trooper for each
Caucasian trooper until the state-wide percentage of African
131
American troopers reached twenty-five percent.
Concluding that
the one-for-one requirement was “flexible, waivable, and
132
temporary,” the Court explained that it was not a goal, but rather
133
the pace at which the twenty-five percent goal would be met, similar
134
to the objective in Sheet Metal Workers.
D. Does the Disparate Impact Provision Impose or Operate as a Quota?
135

The disparate impact provision does not explicitly require quotas,
and in fact, § 703(j) of Title VII disavows any requirement for
preferences on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or
136
religion. But this disavowal is not sufficient to dispel the suggestion
that the provision operates as a quota.
An argument can be made that when the disparate impact
137
provision is applied, it falls within the definition of “quota”
138
139
provided in Bakke and Grutter. Similar to the quota in Bakke, the
disparate impact provision reserves a percentage exclusively for other
racial groups without competition. Under the four-fifths rule, if
128. Id. at 479.
129. 480 U.S. 149, 153 (1986).
130. Id. at 185–86. The Court also upheld quotas in United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979), but this Article does not rely on Weber because it involved a
voluntary quota agreement entered into by private parties lacking state action and
the parties raised only a Title VII claim, not an Equal Protection challenge. See id. at
197 (describing a collective bargaining agreement between employer and union).
131. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 154–55.
132. Id. at 178.
133. Id. at 179.
134. Id. at 180 (citing Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 487–88 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
135. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“To
be sure, the disparate-impact laws do not mandate imposition of quotas . . . .”).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2006).
137. I do not use “quota” as a pejorative but rather as a label for programs that are
not permissible goals.
138. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003) (identifying race as a factor
in determining admission to a law school); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 269–70 (1978) (noting the set-aside program was implemented to ensure a
specified number of minority students were admitted to the medical school
program).
139. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275 (describing the medical school’s policy of admitting
a prescribed number of minority students).
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there is at least twenty percent separation between the selection rate
of the highest performing racial group and other groups, then a
140
In this
plaintiff can prove a prima facie case of disparate impact.
way, the disparate impact provision essentially reserves a
representation rate that is eighty percent of the most successful
group’s selection rate. Additionally, the Grutter Court permitted
universities to “consider race or ethnicity only as a ‘plus’ in a
particular applicant’s file, without insulating the individual from
141
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.”
The
disparate impact provision’s twenty percent reservation insulates
groups from comparison, contrary to the program approved in
142
Grutter.
On the other hand, it is possible to characterize the disparate
143
impact provision as a permissible goal like Grutter’s critical mass.
One can argue that the disparate impact provision functions like a
goal because like critical mass, the disparate impact provision does
144
not establish a set number needed to meet the goal. Even though
the four-fifths rule equates to eighty percent, it is set in relation to the
145
group with the highest pass rate. Consider two examples. First, if
Caucasians had the highest pass rate in Ricci with one hundred
percent passing the test, then there would be a prima facie case of
disparate impact if less than eighty percent of African American
firefighters passed. Second, assume again that Caucasians had the
highest pass rate, but with only fifty percent passing the test. In this
case, there would be a disparate impact if less than forty percent of
African American firefighters passed. Thus, there is no “quota”
because the number of people required to pass in order to avoid
prima facie liability would depend on the group with the highest pass
rate.
Also, the disparate impact provision can be characterized as a
permissible goal because it allows consideration of race plus other
140. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2197 (2010) (holding that a
claim is established by showing that an employer “uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact” on one of the prohibited bases); EEOC
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010).
141. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317) (internal quotations
omitted).
142. See id. (explaining that the policy allowed race to be considered in “a flexible,
nonmechanical way”).
143. See id. at 315–16 (describing the law school’s goal of achieving a critical mass
of diverse students to enrich education).
144. See id. at 335 (emphasizing that the law school did not maintain specified
numbers for minority enrollment).
145. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(2010).
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factors, similar to critical mass. The provision does not rest solely on
race but takes into consideration other factors, such as whether the
employment practice is justified by business necessity and is job
related and whether other equally effective alternatives with fewer
146
adverse effects exist.
There are, however, several problems with equating the disparate
impact provision to critical mass. First, although there is no
predetermined number set by the disparate impact provision, there is
a predetermined percentage or proportion established by the fourfifths rule that must be met to avoid a prima facie case of disparate
147
impact.
In contrast, the critical mass concept approved by the
148
Grutter Court was not quantified by numbers or percentages.
Second, the disparate impact provision does not allow for “a range
149
demarcated by the goal itself” like with critical mass.
In an
admissions program, the number of students that are needed for a
critical mass of diverse students in the entering class can change from
150
year to year. But the proportion or percentage set by the four-fifths
rule needed to satisfy the disparate impact provision is fixed not only
from year to year (unless the EEOC passes new Guidelines), but also
fixed for all employers.
Third, the disparate impact provision differs from critical mass
because critical mass affords consideration of race plus other factors.
Although the disparate impact provision considers other factors for
ultimately determining liability, race is the only consideration at the
initial stage. A plaintiff can show a prima facie case of disparate
impact merely on race alone. “Unless and until the defendant
[employer] pleads and proves a business-necessity defense, the
plaintiff wins simply by showing the stated elements” of disparate
151
impact.
If an employment practice fails the four-fifths rule, an
employer must defend against a prima facie case of disparate
152
impact. Although the disparate impact provision affords employers
the defense of business necessity and job relatedness, it may be of
limited consolation because the costs associated with mounting the
153
defense can be prohibitive.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006).
147. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
148. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–19.
149. Id. at 335 (quoting Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC,
478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
150. Id. at 336.
151. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010).
152. Id.
153. To mount a defense, an employer would need to validate its selection
criteria, at the very least, which would require considerable expense of time and
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Fourth, the disparate impact provision is distinguishable from
critical mass because it lacks a demonstrated need for the quota set by
the provision. In Grutter, the Court approved critical mass because
the school justified that a critical mass of diverse students was integral
154
to the school’s educational mission. In contrast, in Parents Involved
155
(“Parents
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
Involved”) the school board’s failure to show a need for the soughtafter level of diversity led to the Court’s conclusion that the board’s
156
student assignment was not narrowly tailored.
In that case, the
school board used each school’s racial balance as one factor in
157
placing students.
If the school’s racial distribution was not within
ten percentage points of the district’s white to non-white racial
composition, then a student who would contribute to the school’s
158
racial balance would be assigned to the school.
The Court
money. For example, in Ricci, the city spent $100,000 to hire a testing consultant to
develop and administer the examinations. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2665
(2009). One commentator has remarked that “[i]n theory, an employer can win an
adverse impact case by proving that the challenged selection criterion is valid. In
practice, this burden can almost never be carried, and the result is that employers
are forced to hire and promote by quotas.” Gold, supra note 65, at 457.
For additional discussion of the expense and challenges of validation, see Booth &
Mackay, supra note 53; Gold, supra note 6565, at 460 n.82 (explaining that Daniel E.
Leach, vice-chair of EEOC in 1978, estimated criterion validation costing employers
$100,000–$400,000); Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach to Disparate
Impact and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 72 OR. L. REV. 253, 319 (1993) (noting that
validation tests are so exacting and demanding that smaller employers will often
forgo the tests); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1235 (1995) (“Formal validation of even relatively straightforward objective
selection devices is an expensive and time-consuming process, often requiring several
years and hundreds of thousands of dollars in professional fees and employee
time.”); Rutherglen, supra note 49, at 1317–18 (explaining that validation tests are
expensive, costing an estimate of $100,000 and must be completed each time a test is
used for a different job); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense
to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479,
1543 (1996) (“For example, the cost of the most favored form of validation, criterion
validation, has been estimated to be at least $100,000, an expense that has to be
incurred each time a practice is used for a particular job.”); Van Bowen & Riggins,
supra note 45, at 651 (“The burden of validation can be costly as well as impossible in
at least some cases.”).
For a description of the types of validation, see Booth & Mackay, supra note 53, at
162–65; Doreen Canton, Adverse Impact Analysis of Public Sector Employment Tests: Can a
City Devise a Valid Test?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 683, 691–96 (1987).
154. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“Our conclusion that the Law School has a
compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a
diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission,
and that ‘good faith’ on the part of the university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to
the contrary.’” (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318–19
(1978)).
155. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
156. Id. at 726.
157. Id. at 710.
158. Id. at 712.
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explained, “[t]he plans are tied to each district’s specific racial
demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of
159
diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits.”
Similarly, the disparate impact provision fails to demonstrate a
need for the level specified by the four-fifths rule. Researchers have
160
criticized the four-fifths rule as arbitrary. This “arbitrariness” could
be due to the fact that the four-fifths or eighty percent rule resulted
from two compromises:
(1) a desire expressed by those writing and having input into the
Guidelines to include a statistical test as the primary step but
knowing from an administrative point of view a statistical test was
not possible for the FEPC consultants who had to work the
enforcement of the Guidelines, and (2) a way to split the middle
161
between two camps, the 70% camp and the 90% camp.

Consistent with Parents Involved, the EEOC would need to provide
data to support the chosen eighty percent over seventy percent,
ninety percent, or any other percentage and that the four-fifths rule
is necessary to achieve the goal envisioned by the disparate impact
162
provision. Absent supporting evidence for the four-fifths rule, it is,
as the Court pointed out in Sheet Metal Workers, “completely
unrealistic to assume that individuals of each race will gravitate with
mathematical exactitude to each employer . . . absent unlawful
163
discrimination.”
Additionally, even if the EEOC were to jettison the four-fifths rule
or another variation of the rule, the disparate impact could not
operate practically as a “goal” like critical mass. The unique concerns
of uniformity of enforcement as well as giving notice to prospective
plaintiffs and defendants as to when liability may result for disparate
impact make the critical mass approach inapplicable to disparate

159. Id. at 726.
160. Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 189 (1983).
161. Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination,
84 IND. L.J. 773, 782 n.61 (quoting DAN BIDDLE, ADVERSE IMPACT AND TEST
VALIDATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO VALID AND DEFENSIBLE EMPLOYMENT
TESTING 3 (2005)).
162. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
733 (2007) (plurality opinion) (noting the requirement of showing that a racial
classification is necessary to achieve a stated purpose).
163. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494
(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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impact. Critical mass is an approach to using racial classifications
164
that is unique to the educational context.
Critical mass has been used to describe three conditions:
[T]he existence of a precise minimum level of the required
material for a change to take place; a change that is sudden and
transformative; and that the change is not simply a function of a
minimum level of the resource but also a function of how elements
165
of that resource interact with one another.

In the educational context, the law school in Grutter used critical
mass to refer to “meaningful numbers” or “meaningful
representation” needed to encourage minority participation in the
166
classroom without the sense of isolation. In this regard, a university
can practically operate an admissions program without a defined
number as to when critical mass is achieved. It would be hard to
imagine, however, how the EEOC could enforce the disparate impact
provision without a defined number or percentage to serve as a point
of reference in assessing when a disproportionate adverse effect rises
to the level of disparate impact. First, the EEOC would need to
establish a threshold to ensure that it uniformly enforces the
disparate impact provision and does not violate employers’ equal
167
protection rights by varying its application.
Second, the EEOC would also need to be wary of due process
claims for assessing liability upon employers without giving them
notice as to what constitutes disparate impact. The Due Process
Clause has been interpreted to encompass procedural and
168
substantive due process. Procedural due process requires providing

164. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978)
(stating that the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university
admissions program).
165. Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 97, 98–99 (2007).
166. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003). The concept of critical mass
originated in science and refers to the precise minimum amount of mass needed to
create and sustain an explosion. Addis, supra note 165, at 98. Professor Addis points
out that Grutter can be criticized for imprecisely and improperly using the concept of
critical mass because the scientific reference to critical mass is dependent upon
ascertaining a precise minimum amount, whereas the law school in Grutter, despite
Justice Scalia’s prodding, declined to quantify critical mass. Id. at 125–26.
Nonetheless, this section proceeds with an analysis of critical mass as conceptualized
by the law school, since its interpretation of critical mass was accepted by the Court
in Grutter.
167. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90 (“The guarantee of equal protection cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to
a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is
not equal.”).
168. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 603 (3d ed. 2009).
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notice before a person’s life, liberty, or property can be taken away.
An employer would not have adequate notice if it did not have
sufficient information to conform its behavior to the law. Here, if the
disparate impact provision operates without a defined threshold, like
critical mass, employers will not know what level of disparity is
actionable against them. Concomitantly, without a defined threshold
that would trigger disparate impact, prospective plaintiffs would not
know the appropriate circumstances under which to file a disparate
impact claim. Thus, even if the EEOC were to proceed without the
four-fifths rule, it would be difficult for the disparate impact provision
to be enforced without some numerical or percentage threshold.
Whatever the form, any threshold is likely to operate as a quota
170
because it draws a line on the basis of race.
IV. FLEXIBILITY AND INDIVIDUALIZED DECISION MAKING
A second factor in considering whether a program is narrowly
tailored includes the program’s flexibility and individualized decision
making. A program’s flexibility and individualized decision making
are interrelated with each other and the quota factor in that the
characteristics relevant to the quota factor may also be relevant to the
flexibility and individualized decision making of the program.
A. Flexibility
In evaluating whether remedial race-conscious measures are
narrowly tailored, the Court has been concerned with the flexibility
of the remedy. In Paradise, the Court concluded that the one-for-one
promotion quota was flexible because the plan allowed for waiver in
171
the absence of qualified African American candidates.
In Sheet
Metal Workers, the membership goal was narrowly tailored because the
goal was flexible—the district court twice extended the deadline and
accommodated the union’s economic changes by adjusting the
172
apprenticeship class size. The flexibility of the Harvard admissions
program countenanced by Bakke allowed for variation in the weight
accorded to a particular factor each year, as the mix of the student
173
body changed.
Similarly, the flexibility of the program in Grutter

169. Id.
170. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288–89.
171. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 177 (1987).
172. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,
487–88 (1986).
173. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18.
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allowed for yearly fluctuation in the number of underrepresented
174
minority student enrollment.
In contrast, the disparate impact provision does not appear to be
flexible like the goals in Paradise, Sheet Metal Workers, Bakke, or Grutter.
There are no waivers or exceptions to the enforcement of the
disparate impact provision. Additionally, the disparate impact
provision does not allow for yearly variation based on an employer’s
175
need like the Harvard plan in Bakke or the plan in Grutter.
The
ratio established by the four-fifths rule remains constant in each case,
regardless of whether an employer’s needs necessitate variation.
The constancy of the four-fifths rule is problematic for another
reason. The Court requires that for a race-conscious program to
satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement, the weight placed on race
should be no more than is necessary to achieve the compelling
176
government interest.
The four-fifths rule places the same amount
of weight on race regardless of the compelling interest being asserted
to justify the disparate impact provision’s racial classification.
Whether the provision might be justified because it seeks to obtain
the benefits of diversity, provide role models, meet operational
needs, smoke out discrimination, or provide equal employment
opportunities, the four-fifths rule is the only method allowed for
achieving the desired objective.
177
178
In Bakke and Grutter, the Court recognized the need for the
program to vary the weight placed on racial factors. Allowing for
variation ensures that the weight placed on race will be no more than
necessary. The four-fifths rule does not afford variation depending
upon the asserted goal or the employer’s needs.

174. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003).
175. Id. at 336; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18.
176. See Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 523–24 (listing factors the Court has
considered relevant to narrow tailoring).
177. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18 (distinguishing the Harvard admissions program
from the medical school program in that the Harvard program allowed for “the
weight attributed to a particular quality [to] vary from year to year depending upon
the ‘mix’ both of the student body and the applicants for the incoming class”).
178. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (“[T]he number of underrepresented minority
students who ultimately enroll in the Law School differs substantially from their
representation in the applicant pool and varies considerably for each group from
year to year.”). Commentators have pointed out that in actuality the admissions
program in Grutter placed greater emphasis on race than the program in Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 538–39.
Additionally, the use of race via the “critical mass” approach had a greater impact on
admissions than the point system used in Gratz. Id. at 535–36.
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B. Individualized Decision Making
Individualized decision making is another factor relevant to
determining whether disparate impact meets the requirement of
narrow tailoring. Individualized decision making includes requiring
179
180
preferences that are not quantified, are differentiated, and are
181
not excessive.
In Bakke, the Court was concerned by the medical
182
The
school admissions program’s sole focus on ethnic diversity.
Court concluded that assigning a fixed number of seats to minorities
183
was not necessary because it was not the only means to achieve
184
diversity. In juxtaposition, the Bakke Court discussed with approval
185
the admissions program administered at Harvard College.
Although race or ethnicity may have operated as a “plus” for an
applicant, race was not a decisive factor in Harvard’s admissions
186
program.
Instead, the Harvard policy included other qualities in
consideration of diversity and allowed the weight accorded to each
factor to vary each year, depending upon the attributes of the current
187
student body and candidates for the incoming class.
Thus, the
Harvard program employed race “in a flexible, nonmechanical way”
188
that permitted individualized consideration of each applicant. The
Bakke plurality “developed the individualized consideration
requirement in order to police the distinction between an affirmative
action program in which race was a legitimate (but not predominant)
element of difference, and an affirmative action program that was
189
sliding toward ‘the functional equivalent of a quota system.’”
In Grutter, the Court concluded that the law school’s program was
190
narrowly tailored like the Harvard program because of its flexibility.

179. See Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 545 (clarifying that “no quantified
preferences” means that the decision-making process does not have specified weights
in a formula for admission).
180. See id. at 547 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271–73) (noting that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gratz implies that differentiation is required in a decision making
process).
181. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court also attacked placing excessive
emphasis on any single characteristic in the decision making process).
182. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
183. Id. at 316.
184. Id. at 314–15.
185. Id. at 321–24.
186. Id. at 317.
187. Id. at 317–18.
188. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
189. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68–69 (2003) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318).
190. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
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The law school’s program provided a “highly individualized, holistic
191
review [for] each applicant’s file,” regardless of race.
In contrast to the Harvard program discussed in Bakke and the
Grutter program, the lack of individualized decision making was one
factor that led to the invalidation of the admissions program in the
192
companion case Gratz v. Bollinger.
In Gratz, an undergraduate
university employed a multi-factored admissions system that included
the following: “the quality of an applicant’s high school (S), the
strength of an applicant’s high school curriculum (C), an applicant’s
unusual circumstances (U), an applicant’s geographical residence
193
(G), and an applicant’s alumni relationship (A).”
In addition
to these factors, the university considered an applicant’s
“underrepresented minority status, socioeconomic disadvantage, or
attendance at a high school with a predominantly underrepresented
minority population, or underrepresentation in the unit to which the
194
student was applying.”
The Court held that the University’s
program was not narrowly tailored because the school automatically
awarded twenty points to every underrepresented minority, which
195
amounted to one-fifth of the necessary points for admission.
Although the admissions program in Gratz used race as a “plus” factor
like the Harvard program and Grutter program, the automatic
distribution of twenty points did not allow for individualized decision
196
making.
Similarly, in Parents Involved, although the school district employed
a multi-tiered system of tiebreakers, the Court nonetheless concluded
that “under each plan when race comes into play, it [was] decisive by
197
itself.”
Consequently, the school assignment policy was not
191. Id. at 337.
192. 539 U.S. 244, 273–74 (2003).
193. Id. at 254.
194. Id. at 255.
195. Id. at 270.
196. Id. Justice Souter argued in his dissent that the college in Gratz applied a
“holistic review” of its applicants like the law school in Grutter. Id. at 295 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The only difference was that in using the numbered scale, the college
did not “hide the ball.” Id. at 298; see also Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 519 (“If
the government decisionmaker does not ‘tell’ courts how much of a racial
preference it is giving[,] . . . courts will essentially not ‘ask’ probing questions about
whether the preferences are differentiated or excessive.”); Post, supra note 189, at 74
(“[T]he value assigned to race is camouflaged by an opaque process of implicit
comparisons [in Grutter]. Although transparency is ordinarily prized in the law, the
Court in Grutter and Gratz constructs doctrine that in effect demands obscurity.”).
Commentators have pointed out that the “[l]aw [s]chool may have been more
formulaic than the [c]ollege,” but the Court “took the law school at its word its
admissions program was nuanced.” Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 549, 552.
197. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723
(2007) (plurality opinion).
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narrowly tailored because it employed racial factors in a mechanical,
198
rather than individualized manner.
As seen in the above cases, in order for the disparate impact
provision to satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement, it must provide
individualized consideration through case-by-case evaluation.
Determining whether the provision meets this requirement can be
evaluated by framing the issue in two ways. First, does the disparate
impact provision force employers to use racial classification in
making employment decisions in a non-individualized fashion?
When framed this way, it appears that the provision removes
individualized decision making from employers because of the fourfifths rule. Even if an employer were to evaluate each candidate’s
application individually, an employer would create a prima facie
violation of the provision if a disparity of more than twenty percent
occurs between the selection rate of the most successful group and
other racial groups. Even though other factors are later considered
in assessing liability, race is the only factor in determining if there is a
prima facie violation. Like the impact of the automatic twenty point
distribution in Gratz and the multi-tiered tiebreaker system in Parents
Involved, the four-fifths rule makes race a decisive factor for
identifying prima facie violations. Thus, the decisive role that race
plays in implicating a prima facie case of disparate impact supports
Justice Scalia’s criticism that “the disparate-impact provisions sweep
too broadly . . . since they fail to provide an affirmative defense for
good-faith (i.e., nonracially motivated) conduct, or perhaps even for
199
good-faith plus hiring standards that are entirely reasonable.”
Another way to frame the issue is whether the provision allows for
individualized consideration by the courts in assessing disparate
impact liability. It is possible that the disparate impact provision
satisfies the requirement for individualized decision making because
the provision affords consideration of multiple factors in ultimately
determining liability. Before liability is finally assessed under the
provision, a court reviews whether an employer’s business practice is
200
a business necessity and job related. Additionally, a court considers
whether an employer refused to use an equally effective alternative
201
with less adverse effect.
When framed in this way, the disparate impact provision avoids the
deficiency of Gratz. In Gratz, individualized decision making could
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 723.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
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take place once a file was flagged, but the Court was unpersuaded by
this possibility because individual review occurred in exceptional
202
The disparate impact provision,
cases, not as a general rule.
however, provides individual consideration of other factors in every
case of prima facie disparate impact to ultimately determine
203
liability.
In this regard, the provision comports with Grutter and
Bakke’s conceptions of holistic, individual review because race is not
the decisive factor in the final assessment of disparate impact
204
liability.
Thus, whether the disparate impact provision affords
individualized consideration to meet strict scrutiny’s narrowly
tailored requirement depends upon whether the provision is
evaluated at the initial stage when a prima facie case of disparate
impact arises or at the final stage of determining liability when
defenses are considered.
V. SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM: OVERINCLUSIVE AND UNDERINCLUSIVE
A. The Court’s Treatment of Underinclusive and Overinclusive Acts
For the disparate impact provision’s use of racial classification to be
narrowly tailored, such classifications must not be underinclusive or
overinclusive.
An underinclusive classification results when
legislation fails to encompass all similarly situated people in terms of
the legislation’s objective; some people are included while others who
205
are similarly situated for purposes of the law are excluded.
Overinclusiveness occurs when the legislation overreaches in its
inclusion of all persons similarly situated for the purpose of the law
206
and of persons whose inclusion is not relevant to the law’s objective.
Although the Court did not explicitly use the term
“underinclusive” in its analysis in Parents Involved, two concepts of
underinclusiveness can be construed from that case. First,
underinclusive can mean failure to include the persons who should
207
The plurality in Parents
be included for the purpose of the law.
Involved questioned the school districts’ purported interest in
202. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 283–84 (2003).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
204. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (allowing race as a
contributing factor); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317
(1978) (holding that a program that incorporates a “plus” system for race but still
compares all applicants satisfies equal protection).
205. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 746 (8th ed.
2010).
206. Id.
207. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723
(2007) (plurality opinion).
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achieving diversity when the districts focused solely on ethnic
diversity, without considering the “far broader array of qualifications
and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single
208
though important element.” In this regard, the focus on racial or
209
ethnic origin was underinclusive for the goal of achieving diversity.
Moreover, with respect to the consideration of racial diversity, the
districts were underinclusive by considering race exclusively in terms
210
of white and non-white or black and “other.”
A second concept of underinclusiveness entails the minimal impact
or effectiveness of the legislation at achieving its goal. In Parents
Involved, the Court pointed out that the racial tiebreaker ultimately
211
shifted a small number of students.
The limited impact
undermined the necessity of using racial classification to achieve the
212
asserted goal of racial integration for socialization and education.
Overinclusiveness is another factor that is detrimental to a raceconscious program. In Croson, the “gross overinclusiveness” of the
213
plan undermined the argument that the plan was narrowly tailored.
The Court criticized the plan for its “random inclusion” of racial
214
groups that were not victims of discrimination by allowing any
qualified Minority Business Enterprise to take advantage of the thirty
215
percent set aside.
Similarly, in Bakke, the Court questioned the medical school’s
inclusion of African Americans, Mexican Americans, American
Indians, and Asians among the preferred groups for the sixteen seats
set aside, noting that Asians were already admitted in great
216
numbers.
This remark implied that Asians did not need
preferential treatment through the quota and that the Court deemed
217
admissions policy to be overinclusive because of their inclusion.

208. Id. at 722 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003)) (internal
quotations omitted).
209. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 733 (“To the extent the objective is sufficient
diversity[,] . . . using means that treat students solely as members of a racial group is
fundamentally at cross-purposes with that end.”).
210. Id. at 703.
211. Id. at 733.
212. Id. at 734; see also Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of RaceNeutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary
Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 285 (2009) (suggesting that limited impact indicates
existence of alternatives).
213. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 506, 508 (1989).
214. Id. at 506.
215. Id. at 478.
216. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 n.45 (1978).
217. Id.
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The impact of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness on
satisfying the narrowly tailored requirement is even more
pronounced beyond the context of racial classifications. In Citizens
218
United v. FEC, the Court invalidated a statute as violative of the First
Amendment because the statute prohibited independent corporate
219
The
expenditures advocating a candidate’s election or defeat.
purpose of the statute was to protect shareholders from being
compelled to finance corporate political speech, but the statute was
220
considered both underinclusive and overinclusive.
As to
underinclusiveness, the statute only prohibited speech in certain
media and within a certain time frame, even though a shareholder’s
221
interest would be affected regardless of the type of media or time.
Overinclusiveness resulted from the statute’s inclusion of all
corporations, including nonprofit and single-shareholder for-profit
222
corporations.
223
In Carey v. Brown, the Court invalidated a statute that prohibited
picketing of residences or dwellings but allowed peaceful labor
224
The state enacted the statute for the purposes of
picketing.
protecting the peace and privacy of residents from nonlabor
225
picketing, but the Court concluded that the statute violated the
226
The statute was both overinclusive and
Equal Protection Clause.
underinclusive because it permitted peaceful labor picketing without
regard to the disturbances that would result while it broadly banned
nonlabor picketing without distinguishing among the harms
227
to residential privacy.
Therefore, the cases demonstrate
that overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness undermines the
reasonableness of a program’s scope and its satisfaction of the
narrowly tailored requirement.
B. Overinclusive and Underinclusive Due to Probability for Error
When the disparate impact provision is evaluated for
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness to determine narrow
tailoring, one may find the provision’s scope to be problematic. The

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id.
Id.
447 U.S. 455 (1980).
Id. 457–58.
Id. at 458.
Id. 457–58.
Id. at 465.
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disparate impact provision is not narrowly tailored because it may be
overinclusive or underinclusive as a result of its probability for error.
If the provision is overinclusive or underinclusive, its racial
classifications are unnecessary and alternatives are likely available.
A program may be overinclusive and/or underinclusive if it is not
accurate. Studies show that the probability of error with applying the
228
four-fifths rule is high. Researchers have identified three problems
arising from the four-fifths rule:
(1) there is a high probability that an employer will be found to be
discriminating under the four-fifths rule, when in fact, he is not
discriminating; (2) there is a high probability that an employer will
be held harmless due to compliance with the four-fifths rule when,
in fact, he is discriminating against a group of employees; and (3)
the four-fifths rule and statistical significance criterion indicate
229
discrimination in quite different situations.

In one study, Professor Anthony Boardman determined the
probability of making Type I errors (false positives) and Type II
230
errors (false negatives).
Professor Boardman calculated the
outcomes in situations involving two groups and in situations with
231
more than two groups.
He found that the probability for error in
claiming an adverse impact when none existed (Type I error) was
greater than fifty percent when there were two groups with fewer
232
than twenty-five people.
For situations involving more than two
233
The
groups, the probabilities for Type I errors were higher.
chances that people who were adversely impacted but failed to claim
adverse impact (Type II errors) were higher than forty percent,
234
regardless of whether there were two or three groups.
As Professor Boardman concluded, “the EEOC’s rule appears to
invite considerable inappropriate litigation” while “fail[ing] to clearly
228. Anthony E. Boardman, Another Analysis of the EEOC “Four-Fifths” Rule, 25
MGMT. SCI. 770, 776 (1979).
229. Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 189 (1983). But see
Meier et al., supra note 63, at 169 (“The 80% rule appears to be a reasonable
articulation of a statistical criterion to determine whether statistically significant
differences are substantial enough to warrant legal liability.”).
230. Boardman, supra note 228, at 770 (using a model that assumed that the
number of people promoted is predetermined).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 776. Professor Boardman provides detailed explanation of his model
and formulas, but there is no explanation for what may account for Type I and Type
II errors, or why the percentages for these errors are so high.
233. Id.; see also Irwin Greenberg, An Analysis of the EEOC “Four-Fifths” Rule,
25 MGMT. SCI. 762, 765 (1979) (“As the number of groups increases, the chance of
making a type I error increases.”).
234. Boardman, supra note 228, at 776.
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indicate discrimination when discrimination exists.” Although it is
not clear whether a fifty percent likelihood of a Type I error by a
prospective claimant will necessarily equate to a fifty percent
236
likelihood of enforcement by the EEOC and private parties, an
over-filing of adverse impact claims increases the chances that these
mistaken claims will lead to erroneous over-enforcement of the
disparate impact provision and erroneous assessment of liability.
The implication of Type II errors is clearer. Assuming that the
bulk of disparate impact litigation result from claimants filing charges
237
with the EEOC (as opposed to the EEOC initiating charges), if
there is a forty percent likelihood that potential claimants are failing
to file adverse impact charges, it is reasonable to conclude that this
percentage strongly correlates to the percentage of underenforcement by the EEOC and private parties. Thus, Professor
Boardman’s study reveals the immense likelihood that the four-fifths
rule will be overinclusive, casting its enforcement net so widely that it
238
captures employers who are not in fact causing an adverse impact.
235. Id.; see also Richard M. Cohn, On the Use of Statistics in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 55 INDUS. REL. L. J. 493, 493 n.3 (1979) (concluding that the fourfifths rule “can lead either to the false charge of adverse impact or to the conclusion
that no adverse impact exists when, in fact, the employer’s selection procedure is
discriminatory”); Greenberg, supra note 233, at 766 (“[I]t is clear that the four-fifths
rule is not well-suited to achieve equal employment opportunities.”).
236. An unlawful employment complaint begins with a written charged filed by a
complainant under oath. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006). The Commission
determines, after an investigation, whether it has a reasonable cause to believe the
charges are true. After such a determination, the Commission may pursue the
charges by “informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” Id.
If the Commission is unable to obtain voluntary compliance within a set time, the
complainant or, under certain circumstances, another alleged to be aggrieved, or the
EEOC may file a civil action. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Thus, although the Commission is
responsible for reviewing every charge, the Commission may not pursue every charge
beyond the investigation phase. The right-to-sue letter imposes a condition
precedent for private parties filing a Title VII claim in federal court. Roy L. Brooks,
Beyond Civil Rights Restoration Legislation: Restructuring Title VII, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
551, 557 (1989).
For example, in 2010, the Commission received 35,890 charges alleging race-based
discrimination. Of those charges filed, the Commission determined “no reasonable
cause” existed for 26,319 charges (70.1%) and “reasonable cause” existed for 1,330
charges (3.5%). The statistics provided by the EEOC do not distinguish between
disparate treatment charges and disparate impact charges. See Race-Based Charges:
FY 1997–FY 2010, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/race.cfm, (last visited February
14, 2011) (compiling data on race-based discrimination).
237. A member of the EEOC may file a charge when the member believes an
unlawful employment practice exists. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b)(2006); see also BARBARA
T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1626, 1659–62
(C. Geoffrey Weirich et al., eds, 4th ed. 2007)(discussing a commissioner’s charge).
238. See Boardman, supra note 228, at 776 (concluding that this fraction system
presents a double bind: any change to avoid finding discrimination in innocent
employers risks failing to uncover real discrimination).
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His study also supports an inference that the four-fifths rule is
underinclusive, failing to capture the employers who are in fact
239
causing an adverse impact.
240
Numerous studies have yielded similar results.
For example,
Professors Marion Gross Sobol and Charles Ellard concluded that in
some circumstances “the four-fifths rule signals discrimination when
in fact there is none; the four-fifths rule seems to exaggerate true
241
adverse impact.” They also found that in other situations, however,
“[t]he four-fifths rule, instead of exaggerating discrimination with
large . . . numbers, is not sensitive enough to the discriminatory
situation.
Thus, under the four-fifths rule, Type II error is
242
committed.”
Although a majority of the studies on the four-fifths rule were
conducted on the heels of the EEOC’s promulgation of the rule in
1978, recent studies also confirm the fallibility of the rule. In one
study, researchers conducted a statistical survey of the data in Ricci
and concluded that a fair, non-discriminatory test for either the
lieutenant or captain position would fail the four-fifths rule nearly
243
seventy percent of the time.
Additionally, fair tests for both
positions would fail the four-fifths rule at least sixty percent of the
244
245
Researchers using the 0.05 significance level found that
time.

239. See supra text accompanying notes 234–35.
240. See generally Louis J. Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its
Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59, 80–81 (1980) (“This rule can easily
lead to inaccurate results.”); Cohn, supra note 235 (arguing that reliance on
quantitative data can mislead employment discrimination litigants); Greenberg,
supra note 233 (showing that the four-fifths rule fails due to both types of errors);
Meier et al., supra note 63 (comparing two statistical tests and finding the four-fifths
rule more helpful for determining substantial discrimination); Sobol & Ellard, supra
note 48 (finding that, depending on the particular values used, the four-fifths rule
can lead to both types of errors); Van Bowen & Riggins, supra note 45 (testing the
four-fifths methodology for uniformity across employers and finding it lacking).
241. Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 395.
242. Id. at 396.
243. Joseph L. Gastwirth & Weiwen Miao, Formal Statistical Analysis of the Data in
Disparate Impact Cases Provides Sounder Inferences Than the U.S. Government’s ‘Four-Fifths’
Rule: An Examination of the Statistical Evidence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 8 L., PROBABILITY
& RISK 171, 171 (2009).
244. Id.
245. Levels of significance are evidentiary mechanisms of disproving a hypothesis.
R.A. Fisher, responsible for developing the concept of “level of significance,”
regarded
any test of significance that results in a larger than 5% significance level (i.e.,
less than 1.96 standard errors) as unpersuasive, a difference with significance
level between 5% and 2% (i.e., between 1.96 and 2.33 standard errors) as
credible, and a difference with significance level more extreme than 2%
(i.e., greater than 2.33 standard errors) as clearly indicative of a real,
underlying difference.
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despite the lower courts’ conclusions that both the lieutenant and
captain examinations in Ricci had a disparate impact, only one of the
246
tests had differences in pass rates that were statistically significant.
The research concluded that differences in pass rates on the
lieutenant examination were statistically significant, whereas the pass
rate differences on the captain examination “were not close to
247
statistical significance.”
What accounts for the high probability of Type I and II errors in
these studies has not been explained, but perhaps the probability of
errors is related to the four-fifths rule as a threshold for proving
disparate impact. The four-fifths rule may be overinclusive and
248
For
underinclusive depending on the size of the employer.
example, “a small employer with a small absolute disparity between
male and female applicants might face liability under the rule, while
a large employer can have a much greater disparity and still comply
249
with the four-fifths rule.”
Sample size (the size of the employer, i.e., the number of
250
employees in a business) also affects statistical significance tests.
“[T]he smaller the sample size, the larger the disparity in rates can be
251
without reaching statistical significance.”
When the sample size is
Meier et al., supra note 63 63, at 151. An event found to be significant at the 2% level
means a smaller probability that the event resulted from randomness as compared
with a 5% level of significance. Id.
Researchers generally use a five percent (0.05) level of significance, which is also
known as the ninety-five percent confidence level. See Peresie, supra note 161, at 785;
Elaine W. Shoben, Comment, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing:
Statistical Proof under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793, 800 (1978) (“Statisticians often
adopt a 5% rule of thumb, rejecting the null hypothesis if the probability of
obtaining the sample pass rate difference by chance is less than 5%.”); Van Bowen &
Riggins, supra note 45, at 651 (“Statisticians use the five percent figure most often
and refer to it as the ninety-five percent level of significance.”). But see Meier et al.,
supra note 63, at 151 n.46 (citing William H. Kruskal, Significance, Tests of, in
2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICS 944 (William H. Kruskal & Judith A.
Tanur, eds., 1978) (“[T]here is no professional consensus about the proper use of
significance levels, or about which level of significance is critical, to claim the law’s
particular attention.”). The five percent level of significance has also “been accepted
in many legal decisions.” Gatswirth & Miao, supra note 243, at 176; Scott W.
McKinley, Comment, The Need for Legislative or Judicial Clarity on the Four-Fifths Rule and
How Employers in the Sixth Circuit Can Survive the Ambiguity, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 171,
197–98 (2008) (discussing the .05 and .01 confidence levels as “cited with approval
by courts as a proper method of measuring statistical significance” (citations
omitted) (internal quotations omitted)).
246. Gastwirth & Miao, supra note 243, at 173.
247. Id.
248. Peresie, supra note 161, at 784.
249. Id.
250. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 155.
251. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at 206
(“When samples are very small, large differentials are necessary to obtain statistically
significant results.”).
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small, there is a greater likelihood of false negatives, indicating the
252
On the other
absence of discrimination, when, in fact, it exists.
hand, the larger the sample size, the more it will amplify any
253
difference. Therefore, “whereas the four-fifths rule could be said to
itself have a disparate impact on small employers, the statistical
significance rule could be said to have a disparate impact on large
employers because even a small disparity may achieve statistical
254
significance.”
As a result of the effect of sample size, the disparate impact
provision allows courts to choose sides merely by the measure of
255
disparity selected.
A small employer has a greater risk of liability
under the four-fifths rule than under a statistical significance test,
while a large employer faces the opposite risk. On the other hand, a
small sample size causes defendants to favor statistical significance

252. Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at 206.
253. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 160 (“[L]arge sample sizes will tend to make
any difference statistically significant.”). Researchers caution that one possible
consequence of the effect of sample size on statistical significance tests is the
pressure to resort to quotas. Id. at 161. Professors Meier, Sacks, and Zabell explain
that businesses employing large numbers inevitably will be liable for disparate impact
against a group. Id. Such businesses will be faced with the choice of expending
thousands to validate their selection criteria or avoid the costs of validation by opting
to use quotas, rather than the selection criteria. Id. (citing Barbara Lerner,
Washington v. Davis: Quantity, Quality and Equality in Employment Testing, 1976
SUP. CT. REV. 263). For additional discussion about the expense of time and money
necessary for validation tests, see supra note 152.
The Court has been sensitive to the potential for disparate impact to lead
employers to adopt quotas: “We agree that the inevitable focus on statistics in
disparate impact cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt prophylactic
measures.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (plurality
opinion). The Watson Court opined, “If quotas and preferential treatment become
the only cost-effective means of avoiding expensive litigation and potentially
catastrophic liability, such measures will be widely adopted.” Id. at 993. Ricci
reiterated a similar concern: The “focus on statistics could put undue pressure on
employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 129
S. Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009) (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 992) (internal quotations
omitted). But see Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why
Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1489
(1996) (arguing that the disparate impact provision does not induce quotas).
254. Peresie, supra note 161, at 787; see also Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at
216 (“When few individuals are selected the probability that the protected group
might claim adverse impact is much higher under the four-fifths rule than under the
statistical significance rules. When 200 people are selected, the rules are identical,
while for larger selections the statistical significance rules are more stringent for the
employer than is the four-fifths rule.”); Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 393 n.40
(1988) (“For very small sample sizes both the 4/5ths rule and a binomial test, based
upon approximation to the normal distribution, are inadequate measures of
discrimination. In the case of the 4/5ths rule, the effect of hiring or failing to hire
just one person has a grossly disproportionate effect on the determination of
discrimination.”); Shoben, supra note 245, at 809 (describing the importance of
sample size in determining whether a discrepancy in pass rates is significant).
255. Peresie, supra note 161, at 789.
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and plaintiffs to favor the four-fifths rule—but as the sample size
256
Applying these results, if a
increases, that preference switches.
court is pro-defendant, “it will prefer the four-fifths rule where the
selection rates at issue are high (because a significant disparity will
257
not be actionable), but not where the selection rates are low.”
Thus, whether disparate impact is measured by statistical significance
tests or the four-fifths rule, the disparate impact provision is prone to
be overinclusive and underinclusive.
Another related problem with the four-fifths rule is that it does not
258
assist courts in assessing causation.
Instead, the rule creates a “high
threshold (the four-fifths ratio) necessary to establish a disparate
impact in order to provide for the possibility that other factors are
causing the disparity. But this at most indirectly evaluates causation
259
and results in a significant false negatives problem.” This criticism
affects the efficacy of the disparate impact provision in achieving its
purpose. As seen in Parents Involved, the limited impact the provision
has on attaining its asserted goal undermines its ability to satisfy the
260
narrow tailoring requirement.
If the disparate impact provision, however, takes into consideration
sample size and statistical significance, it might avoid the criticism of
being underinclusive or overinclusive and not causally relevant. As
some researchers suggest, “[t]he 80% rule appears to be a reasonable
articulation of a statistical criterion to determine whether statistically
significant differences are substantial enough to warrant legal
261
liability.”
The four-fifths rule appears to allow for the effect of
262
sample size by “incorporating a measure of practical significance.”

256. Id.; see also Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 398 (“The error of the four-fifths
rule also increases as the size of the hiring population increases. For small numbers
of hires the four-fifths criterion is actually more demanding on the employer than
the binomial test. For large numbers of hires the binomial test is more demanding
on the employer. Thus, in comparison to the binomial test, the four-fifths rule will
be more likely to find discrimination where it does not exist (Type I error) for a small
firm, and less likely to find discrimination where it does exist (Type II error) for a
large firm.”); Van Bowen & Riggins, supra note 45, at 650 (“[T]he four-fifths or
eighty per cent rule is not statistically valid and should not be used because it does
not apply consistently to all employers. . . . The eighty percent rule produces
different results depending on variables in the percentage of minorities in the
relevant labor pool and in the number of selections made.”).
257. Peresie, supra note 161, at 789.
258. Id. at 791.
259. Id. at 791.
260. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 734
(2007) (plurality opinion) (explaining the failed policy of using racial classifications
to determine school assignments for minority students).
261. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 169.
262. Id. at 168. The four-fifths rule provides as follows:
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If researchers Boardman, Vining, Sobol, Ellard, and others took the
four-fifths rule’s allowance for sample size into account and if their
results are unaffected, then their conclusions concerning the
disparate impact provision’s potential for false positive and false
negative errors might still show that the provision is vulnerable to
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness. If, however, the four-fifths
rule’s allowance for sample size was not considered, it might affect
the results of the researchers’ conclusions about false positive and
false negative errors, and consequently the determination of the
reasonableness of the disparate impact provision’s scope. Thus,
whether the provision is narrowly tailored in this regard is unsettled.
C. Exclusion of White Males Would Lead to Underinclusiveness
The purpose of the disparate impact provision may be frustrated if
it excludes individuals of a certain racial group from alleging
discrimination based on race, despite their historical safety from
discrimination. For example, the disparate impact provision may be
underinclusive if it excludes white males from making disparate
263
impact claims. No definitive answer to the question of whether the
provision allows for claims by white males can be found among the
Supreme Court cases involving disparate impact because there have

Smaller differences in selection rate may nevertheless constitute adverse
impact, where they are significant in both statistical and practical terms or
where a user’s actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on
grounds of race, sex, or ethnic group. Greater differences in selection rate
may not constitute adverse impact where the differences are based on small
numbers and are not statistically significant, or where special recruiting or
other programs cause the pool of minority or female candidates to be
atypical of the normal pool of applicants from that group. Where the user’s
evidence concerning the impact of a selection procedure indicates adverse
impact but is based upon numbers which are too small to be reliable,
evidence concerning the impact of the procedure over a longer period of
time and/or evidence concerning the impact which the selection procedure
had when used in the same manner in similar circumstances elsewhere may
be considered in determining adverse impact.
EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010).
263. Interestingly, veterans’ preference is one of the few, if not the only, neutral
selection device that affords African Americans an advantage over whites.
See Chamallas, supra note 88, at 368 n.310 (citing Smith v. City of E. Cleveland, 363
F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Smith v. Troyan,
520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975)). In Smith, only thirty-six percent of the white
applicants were veterans and entitled to a veterans’ preference compared with the
seventy-five percent of African American applicants who were veterans and also given
the preference. 363 F. Supp. at 1146. The plaintiffs, however, consisted of African
Americans and females. Id. at 1133.
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264

not been any white male plaintiffs.
Additionally, there is no
265
consensus among commentators.
The arguments against applying the disparate impact provision in
favor of white males center on the legislative intent of the Civil Rights
266
Acts of 1964 and 1991.
Griggs and Sheet Metal Workers suggest that
264. Primus, supra note 22, at 527; Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside
Down?: Disparate Impact Claims By White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1524 (2004).
Although Ricci is a Supreme Court case that involved disparate impact, Ricci does
not provide an answer as to whether the provision protects white males because the
white male plaintiffs challenged the city’s action under the disparate treatment
provision and the Equal Protection Clause. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664
(2009). The disparate impact issue in Ricci related to whether the city had “a strong
basis in evidence” to believe that African American firefighters had a disparate
impact claim. Id. at 2681.
While the Supreme Court has yet to address a case involving white males filing
disparate impact claims, several lower courts have confronted this issue. See, e.g.,
Barnhill v. Chicago Police Department, 142 F. Supp. 2d 948, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (suit by
white-male plaintiffs against police department alleging that an examination had a
discriminatory impact on Caucasians in contravention of Title VII); Foss v. Thompson,
242 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001)(allegation by white male that the employer’s
requirement that applicants have a nursing degree caused a disparate impact on the
basis of sex); Zottola v. City of Oakland, 32 F. App’x 307, 309 (9th Cir.
2002)(involving a claim that the city’s use of oral interviews as part of an examination
for hiring firefighters had a disparate impact on white males); Sims v. Montgomery
County Sheriff’s Department, 887 F. Supp. 1479, 1485–86 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (claim by
white male deputy intervenors that inadequate notice of a deadline caused a
disparate impact on white males but the court found the claim lacked merit); Johnson
v. Holley, Nos. 3:07-0979, 3:08-0031, 2008 WL 3163531, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4,
2008)(court recognizing plaintiffs’ argument that a police department promotional
examination had a disparate impact on white males).
These cases do not directly hold that white males are covered by the disparate
impact provision. By allowing claims by white males to proceed and addressing the
merits of their disparate impact claim, however, the courts recognized implicitly that
white males fall within the protection of the provision. In all of these cases, none of
the defendants argued that the disparate impact provision was unavailable to white
males, nor did the courts hesitate to conduct its analysis on the merits of the
disparate impact claim for want of proper plaintiffs. The courts did not dismiss the
cases because the plaintiffs were white males and ineligible to assert disparate impact
claim by virtue of race and sex, but rather the courts disposed of these cases for lack
of evidence showing a prima facie case of disparate impact. These cases are evidence
that white males may proceed under the disparate impact theory if sufficient
evidence exists.
265. Primus, supra note 22, at 527; Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1524. For
arguments that disparate impact claims are unavailable to white males, see
Chamallas, supra note 88, at 366–68; Kate L. Didech, Note, The Extension of Disparate
Impact Theory to White Men: What the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Plainly Does not Mean,
10 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 55, 74–75 (2004) For arguments favoring inclusion of white
males, see Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 523, 558 (1991); Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1512; Michael L. Zimmer,
Individual Disparate Impact Law: On the Plain Meaning of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 501–02 (1999).
266. See Chamallas, supra note 88, at 367 (arguing that Congress “was concerned
with improving the economic status of blacks”); Didech, supra note 265, at 74
(arguing that extending disparate impact theory to white men is “not within the
statute’s spirit and the intention of its makers”); John J. Donahue III, Comment,
Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively Mandated Benefits for Selected
Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897, 898 (2001).
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the original intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to protect
minorities only: “Title VII was designed ‘to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
267
employees.’”
268
Additionally, United Steelworks v. Weber can be interpreted as
supporting a limitation against extending the disparate impact
269
provision to protect white males.
In Weber, the Court concluded
that “Congress’ primary concern in enacting the prohibition against
racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
270
with ‘the plight of the Negro in our economy.’”
The Weber Court
decided that “it was clear to Congress that ‘[t]he crux of the problem
[was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations
which have been traditionally closed to them,’ and it was to this
problem that Title VII’s prohibition against racial discrimination in
271
employment was primarily addressed.”
Finally, the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 could
support a similar interpretation. Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991
adopted the definitions of business necessity and job relatedness
272
from Griggs, it codified the theory of disparate impact along with
273
the Court’s interpreted limitations.
There are, however, problems with the theory that white males
cannot avail themselves of the disparate impact provision. While the
language of Griggs suggests a limitation against white males, McDonald
274
v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., Bakke, and Teal support allowing
disparate impact claims by white males. McDonald involved a claim of
discrimination by a white male who was discharged by his employer
and addressed whether Title VII covered intentional discrimination
275
against white employees. Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous
court, declared:
267. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448
(1986) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–03 (1971)).
268. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
269. Id. at 199, 209 (permitting under Title VII an affirmative action plan
bargained by the union and employer that reserved fifty percent of the openings in a
training program for African American employees).
270. Id. at 202 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. S6548 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1964)
(statement of Rep. Humphrey)).
271. Id. at 203 (alterations original) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964)
(statement of Rep. Humphrey)).
272. See 137 Cong. Rec. 30630, 30662 (1991) (stating that codifying Griggs was one
of the purposes of § 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
273. Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1534.
274. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
275. Id. at 278–80.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge of
“any individual” because of “such individual’s race.” Its terms are
not limited to discrimination against members of any particular
race. . . . This conclusion is in accord with uncontradicted
legislative history to the effect that Title VII was intended to “cover
white men and white women and all Americans” and create an
“obligation not to discriminate against whites.” We therefore hold
today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white
petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be
276
applicable were they Negroes and Jackson white.

Although McDonald did not raise a disparate impact claim, the
Court’s holding suggests that Title VII is universally available.
Bakke also buttresses an inclusive interpretation of the disparate
impact provision to encompass white males. In Bakke, the medical
school argued that the Court should not apply strict scrutiny because
the plaintiff, a white male, is not among a “discrete and insular
277
minority” group that is afforded heightened protection. The Court
unequivocally declared that “[r]acial and ethnic classifications,
however, are subject to stringent examination without regard to these
278
additional characteristics.” The Court explained, “[a]lthough many
of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment conceived of its
primary function as bridging the vast distance between members of
the Negro race and the white ‘majority,’ the Amendment itself was
framed in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin,
279
or condition of prior servitude.”
Similarly, although Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964
280
and 1991 with the vision of bringing equality to African Americans,
the disparate impact provision, too, was framed in universal terms. As
Bakke demonstrated, the universal language of an act prevails over
281
Congressional intent.
Therefore, because the disparate impact
provision was written in universal terms, the provision also affords
white males protection.
Additionally, Teal’s individual-centered approach also supports an
expansive interpretation of the disparate impact provision. In Teal,
the plaintiffs filed a disparate impact claim because an employment
276. Id. at 278–80 (internal citations omitted).
277. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978).
278. Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)).
279. Id. at 293 (internal citation omitted).
280. See Ngov, supra note 19, at 84–87.
281. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 337–38 (explaining that the broad language of the
statute reflects the legislature’s intent for judicial determination of the statute’s
applicability).
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test that was required for promotion had an adverse effect on African
282
The employer asserted a “bottom-line” theory of
Americans.
defense, arguing that the employer should not be liable for disparate
impact caused by the test if the bottom-line outcome of the
283
promotional process achieved racial balance.
Teal rejected the bottom-line defense because Title VII’s principle
284
of equality centered on the individual, not groups.
The Court
concluded, “Title VII strives to achieve equality of opportunity by
rooting out ‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary’ employer-created
barriers to professional development that have a discriminatory
285
impact upon individuals.”
If, as interpreted by Teal, the disparate
impact provision’s purpose is to protect individuals, not groups, then
the provision should not exclude an entire class of individuals—white
286
males.
Arguably, Teal’s individual-centered approach can be construed to
restrict white males from asserting a disparate impact claim. It is
possible that while Teal interpreted Title VII as securing protection
287
for individuals, it intended to address only minorities. In Teal, the
Court stated, “[t]he suggestion that disparate impact should be
measured only at the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII
guarantees these individual respondents the opportunity to compete
288
equally with white workers on the basis of job-related criteria.”
Teal’s reference to “white workers” may have the same limiting effect
289
290
as Griggs’s reference to “white employees” as previously discussed.
But this argument may be less persuasive in light of the context of
Teal and Griggs. It is important to recognize that Teal and the other
Supreme Court cases containing language that suggests the
unavailability of disparate impact claims for white males all involved
291
minority and female plaintiffs. Also, although Weber and Sheet Metal

282. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443–44 (1982).
283. Id. at 442.
284. See id. at 451 (describing Title VII’s purpose of eliminating employment
barriers that bar individuals from advancing).
285. Id. (emphasis added).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
290. See supra text accompanying note 267.
291. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231–32 (1989) (female
candidate refused partnership position in firm); Teal, 457 U.S. at 442–43 (black
employees allege discrimination on promotion examination); Griggs, 401 U.S. at
426–27 (black employees sue for discriminatory employment practices).

NGOV.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

578

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/24/2011 5:39 PM

[Vol. 60:535

Workers involved white plaintiffs, they did not directly assert a
292
disparate impact claim.
Ultimately, even if the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1991 did not extend protection to white males, precluding
white males from asserting a disparate impact claim would raise an
obvious equal protection challenge. Such a restrictive interpretation
of the disparate impact provision would be contrary to our current
293
notions of what is emblematic of the Equal Protection Clause. The
exclusion of white males from the protection of the provision would,
in and of itself, involve a classification resulting in unequal
application of the provision, which would trigger strict scrutiny and
require a compelling interest to justify this exclusion.
Additionally, regardless of the asserted compelling interest, for
example, smoking out discrimination, providing role models,
attaining the benefits of diversity, meeting operational needs, or
294
removing barriers to equal employment opportunities, excluding
white males from asserting a disparate impact claim would render the
provision underinclusive in meeting any one of these interests. For
example, if the disparate impact provision’s racial classification was
intended to attain the benefits of diversity, excluding white males
from the provision’s coverage would hamper the furtherance of
295
fostering cross-racial understanding and problem solving. Consider
another example.
If the compelling interest underlying the
provision’s racial classification rested on removing barriers to equal
employment opportunities, that goal would be more effectively
achieved if it allowed white males to sue for disparate impact.
In light of the potential Equal Protection Clause violation that a
restrictive interpretation of the disparate impact provision would
raise, the rules of statutory construction would necessitate that white
males be included. The Court has operated under the principle that
it will construe a statute in a manner that avoids declaring an act

292. See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 478 U.S. 421, 426 (1986)
(determining whether a court can compel relief from discrimination that may
benefit individuals who have not been subjected to historical discrimination); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200–01 (1979) (determining the validity of a
negotiated affirmative action plan in the hiring policy).
293. See Primus, supra note 22, at 496 (explaining the modern notion of equal
protection as hostile towards government action that seeks to redress historical
discrimination).
294. See Ngov, supra note 19, at 19 (discussing possible compelling interests that
may justify the disparate impact provision’s racial classification under an Equal
Protection Clause challenge).
295. See id. at 49–52 (discussing asserted benefits of diversity).
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296

invalid if it is fairly possible to do so.
Reliance on the plain
language of the statute provides an expansive interpretation of the
provision and would allow the Court to fairly avoid invalidating the
provision for failing to include white males.
VI. DURATION
For the disparate impact provision to pass strict scrutiny, it must
297
also be narrowly tailored in duration. Duration is a critical factor in
evaluating whether a program is narrowly tailored because the Court
has established that “all governmental use of race must have a logical
298
end point.”
As the Court has explained, “[t]his requirement
reflects that racial classifications, however compelling their goals, are
potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly
than the interest demands. Enshrining a permanent justification for
racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection
299
principle.”
A durational requirement has been applied in remedial programs
in order to ensure that a program intended to remedy past
discrimination is not being used simply to achieve and maintain
300
racial balance.
In Croson, the Court required findings not only to

296. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.”).
297. A normative discussion of whether affirmative action programs should have
durational limits is beyond the scope of this article.
298. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003). For example, the Court was
reluctant to permit affirmative action programs that had “no logical stopping point”
in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education. 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (plurality opinion).
299. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. In his concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick,
Justice Powell wrote that the “temporary nature of this remedy ensures that a raceconscious program will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed
to eliminate.” 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
300. See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,
475 (1986) (explaining that though a court has discretion to fashion appropriate
remedies for Title VII violations, a court “should exercise its discretion with an eye
towards Congress’ concern that race-conscious affirmative measures not be invoked
simply to create a racially balanced work force”). Some courts have dissolved
remedial plans that have lasted for thirty years. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate
Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 764 (2006) (describing the Boston
police and fire department’s use of remedial hiring plans and their dissolution by the
district court after their existence for more than thirty years). These plans were
instituted pursuant to consent decrees, which were relied on even after the remedial
goals specified in the decrees had been accomplished. Id. Other courts, however,
have allowed remedial plans to continue after having lasted well over thirty years. In
Cotter v. City of Boston, the court found that discrimination existed as early as 1972.
323 F.3d 160, 169 (2003). When the city’s remedial plan was challenged, the court
was persuaded that “remedying past discrimination takes time” and decided that
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support a remedial need but also “to assure all citizens that the
deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic
groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the
301
goal of equality itself.” Therefore, although the Court ultimately
held that the city lacked a remedial purpose, it envisioned remedial
302
programs as temporary devices.
Additionally, Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers support requiring a
durational limit for race-conscious programs, as evidenced by the
Court’s conclusions that the challenged programs were narrowly
303
tailored because they were temporary.
The Court described the
membership goal in Sheet Metal Workers as a “temporary measure[]”
that would end when the percentage of minorities in the local work
304
force was reflected in the percentage of minorities in the union.
The Court concluded that the membership goal “operate[d] as a
temporary tool for remedying past discrimination without attempting
305
to maintain a previously achieved balance.”
Likewise, the Court determined that the quota in Paradise was
“ephemeral” because “the term of its application [was] contingent
306
upon the Department’s own conduct,” and explained that the fifty
percent quota was “not itself the goal; rather it represent[ed] the
307
speed at which the goal of 25% [would] be achieved.” The Court
analogized the goal in Paradise to the end date imposed in Sheet Metal
Workers: “In these circumstances, the use of a temporary requirement
of 50% minority promotions, which, like the end date in Sheet Metal
Workers, was crafted and applied flexibly, was constitutionally
308
permissible.”
In circumstances where the compelling interest is something other
than remedial, the Court has been equally insistent on time limits.
Grutter is one example. Because the race-conscious program in
Grutter was upheld on a compelling interest of achieving diversity and
attaining its benefits, rather than on remedial grounds, one would

“[w]hile the numbers are more representative today, [the court was] not prepared to
rule that all effects of past discrimination have been eliminated.” Id.
301. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
302. Id.
303. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 178 (1987) (plurality opinion); Sheet
Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479.
304. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (internal quotations omitted)).
305. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
306. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178.
307. Id. at 179.
308. Id. at 180.
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309

not expect a durational limit on diversity. On the other hand, one
might expect a time limit for remedial programs because once the
discrimination has been remedied, assuming that it can be reliably
and readily ascertained, the program may no longer be necessary.
Remedial programs seek to redress a “particular quantum of harm”
310
with “clearer, more finite endpoints.”
Setting a durational limit on diversity, however, may be
incongruous because it would amount to setting an “expiration date”
311
312
on diversity.
Diversity is not temporal by nature.
As Professor
Robert Post explains, “[i]f diversity is necessary in order to train
competent professionals, for example, it is necessary at any and all
times; there is no intrinsic time horizon when this need for diversity
313
will disappear.”
Nonetheless, the Grutter Court refused to exempt the admissions
314
program from durational limits, which the Court contemplated
could be satisfied by sunset provisions and periodic reviews of the
315
program to assess its necessity.
Consequently, Justice O’Connor
anticipated the following:
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of
race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context
of higher education. . . . We expect that 25 years from now, the use
309. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338, 343 (2003) (extolling the virtues
of a “broad range of qualities” outside of solely race as “valuable contributions” to the
compelling interest of “student body diversity”).
310. See Bryan W. Leach, Note, Race as Mission Critical: The Occupational Need
Rationale in Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE L.J. 1093, 1101 (2004)
(reporting that the durational limit inherent in remedial programs is attractive to a
judiciary that does not want to “endorse open-ended schemes”).
311. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?,
21 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 173 (2004) (arguing that the Court’s twenty-five-year
sunset provision on affirmative action programs does not make sense when applied
to student diversity as the compelling interest because “universities could still want to
strive for a racially diverse student body even if an institution’s past discriminatory
history has been fully addressed”).
312. See Johnson, supra note 311, at 183 (“[T]ime limits are normally associated
with affirmative action programs designed to remedy past discrimination, not those
aimed at ensuring a diverse student body.”); Post, supra note 189, at 67–68 n.306
(“[T]he justification of diversity, unlike remedy, has no built-in time horizon; if
diversity is necessary for the quality of education, it is necessary at any and all
times.”); Christopher J. Schmidt, Caught in a Paradox: Problems with Grutter’s
Expectation that Race-Conscious Admissions Programs Will End in Twenty-Five Years,
24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 753, 761 (2004) (describing the Court’s holding in Grutter
“abrupt” and “puzzling” because a “time limitation requirement contradicts its
conclusion that diversity is a compelling state interest since diversity is a non-time
sensitive interest”).
313. Post, supra note 189, at 67 n.306.
314. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“We see no reason to exempt race-conscious
admissions programs from the requirement that all governmental use of race must
have a logical end point.”).
315. Id.
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of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
316
[diversity] interest . . . .

In light of the above cases, regardless of the type of compelling
interest that might justify the disparate impact provision’s racial
classifications, the provision must have a durational limit. Arguably,
the provision’s four-fifths rule can be construed as an end date like
the twenty-five percent goal in Paradise and twenty-nine percent goal
317
in Sheet Metal Workers. Under this argument, the four-fifths rule sets
the pace at which the goal will be met.
One notable difference, however, is that enforcement of the goals
in Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers ceased once the remedial goals
318
were achieved, thereby ensuring the goals’ temporary status.
In
contrast, even if the disparate impact provision serves a remedial
need like that found in Paradise or Sheet Metal Workers, the four-fifths
rule will not be lifted for the employer who has met the four-fifths or
319
eighty percent proportion.
The four-fifths rule continues to be
enforced for every aspect of a business’s operation and, therefore, is
320
not likely temporary. In effect, the four-fifths rule seeks to maintain
a balanced work force, contrary to the Court’s prohibition, not
321
merely to attain one.
If the four-fifths rule is not itself a time limit, then a limit must be
set for the disparate impact provision. Because Justice O’Connor
contemplated a durational limit for diversity, a similar limit could be

316. Id. at 343; see also Johnson, supra note 311, at 182–85 (discussing the
justifications for time limits, institutional competence to establish time limits, and
whether time limits are realistic).
317. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 180–81 (1987) (concluding that a
goal of twenty-five percent representation is an appropriate goal to remedy past
discrimination); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421, 440–41 (1986) (plurality opinion) (refusing to question the lower court’s order
for twenty-nine percent minority representation).
318. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 176 (acknowledging that judicial oversight would end
once the Alabama Department for Public Safety had satisfied the district court’s
order); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479 (stating that the district court’s order was
temporary and would end as soon as the “percentage of minority union members
approximate[d] the percentage of minorities in the local labor force”).
319. See supra Part I.C.
320. See supra Part I.C.
321. In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court disapproved of government programs
designed to maintain racial balances. 478 U.S. 421, 476 (1986). In Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, the Supreme Court emphasized that the approved plan “was
intended to attain a balanced work force, not to maintain one.” 480 U.S. 616, 639
(1987).
Although Johnson involved an issue of gender rather than racial
discrimination and was reviewed under Title VII because the parties did not raise a
constitutional question, the Court’s distinction between attaining and maintaining a
balanced work force is applicable to the issue at hand. See id. at 622 (explaining that
the EEOC’s challenged plan had an eventual goal of thirty-six percent female
representation).
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imposed for the disparate impact provision if its intended purpose is
diversity. There is, however, some lack of clarity with Justice
O’Connor’s statement. First, it is not clear whether Justice O’Connor
contemplated a twenty-five year durational limit or a fifty year limit
because of her reference to Justice Powell’s approval of diversity in
322
Bakke, which occurred twenty-five years before Grutter. Second, it is
unclear whether Justice O’Connor would expect a similar limit for
race-conscious programs designed to advance other non-remedial
interests, like providing role models, meeting occupational needs,
and providing equal employment opportunities.
Assuming that Justice O’Connor’s expectation also applies to nonremedial goals, it is necessary to assess whether the disparate impact
provision complies with the twenty-five year or fifty year durational
limit. In the circumstance of race-conscious admissions programs, a
school’s compliance with the durational limit set by Justice O’Connor
could easily be determined from the date of an admissions program’s
application. For the disparate impact provision, there are three ways
to measure its compliance with Justice O’Connor’s durational limit:
using the year when the Court adopted the disparate impact theory,
when the EEOC established the four-fifths rule, or when Congress
promulgated the disparate impact provision.
If one measures the disparate impact provision’s compliance with
the time limit from the year the Court began applying the disparate
323
impact theory in Griggs (1971), the provision has exceeded Justice
O’Connor’s twenty-five year durational limit. Similarly, if one uses
324
the four-fifths rule’s passage date (1978), the provision again would
fail the twenty-five year durational limit. If, however, one uses the
325
year of the provision’s congressional passage (1991), the provision
would be in compliance until the year 2016. If one applies the fifty
year durational limit, the disparate impact provision would be in
compliance regardless of the method of measurement.
VII. NECESSITY AND RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES
A. The Importance of Race-Neutral Alternatives
To demonstrate that the use of racial classifications is necessary,
the government must show the unavailability or ineffectiveness of

322.
323.
324.
325.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
See supra text accompanying note 48.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A) (2006).
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326

race-neutral alternatives to achieve its goal.
Croson required the
government to exhaust race-neutral alternatives before resorting to
327
racial classifications. In Croson, the city failed to consider any race328
neutral alternatives.
It seemed logical to the Court that the city
should have investigated race-neutral alternatives because the city
cited many race neutral barriers to minority participation. The Court
suggested race-neutral alternatives, such as city financing for small
firms if Minority Business Enterprises disproportionately lacked
329
“increas[ing] the accessibility of city contracting
capital,
opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all races[,]” and also
“[s]implification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding
requirements, and training and financial aid for disadvantaged
330
entrepreneurs of all races.”
Although Grutter did “not require exhaustion of every conceivable
331
race-neutral alternative,” it held that “[n]arrow tailoring does,
however, require serious, good faith consideration of workable race332
neutral alternatives.”
Later in Parents Involved, the plurality
reiterated Grutter’s requirement to examine race-neutral alternatives
333
and criticized the districts for failing to make such considerations.
In contrast, the programs in Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise were
narrowly tailored because there were no other alternatives to the
race-conscious programs. In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court approved
of “stronger measures” because the district court had already
considered alternative remedies in light of the union’s deliberate

326. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious,
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives . . . .”); Robinson,
supra note 212, at 285 (construing the Court’s rejection of racial classification in
Parents Involved as a result of “the plans’ limited impact” that “indicated that
alternative approaches would accomplish the same goals,” and was thus not narrowly
tailored).
327. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (reasoning
that the set-aside program was not narrowly tailored because there were multiple
race-neutral alternatives that could lead to greater minority participation in the
construction industry).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 509–10.
331. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. The Court’s relaxation of narrow tailoring was
perhaps due to a presumption of good faith on the part of the school. See id. at 329
(“Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student
body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of
the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that ‘good faith’ on the part of a
university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”).
332. Id. at 339.
333. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735
(2007) (plurality opinion) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339).
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334

delays in carrying out the district court’s initial remedial order.
Because of similar “foot dragging” in Paradise, the Court also found
335
In
that the lower court adequately considered other alternatives.
both Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers, the proposed alternatives fell
short of addressing the long term, pervasive discrimination caused by
336
the government.
Thus, when the government uses racial
classifications, it must at least show it has considered race-neutral
alternatives.
B. Race-Neutral Alternatives for the Disparate Impact Provision’s Racial
Classifications
The disparate impact provision’s racial classifications may not be
narrowly tailored if there are neutral alternatives available.
Consideration of the availability of neutral alternatives depends on
the compelling purpose for the provision’s use of race. If the
provision is intended to remedy past discrimination, there are
possible alternatives to explore such as providing preparatory testing
337
338
339
materials, training, or financial aid. If the compelling purpose
of the provision is to increase diversity or provide equal
opportunities, those same alternatives could be explored.
Additionally, sensitivity training could be provided to promote the
340
cross-racial understanding that is believed to derive from diversity.
Perhaps the one compelling interest where there is no available
race-neutral alternative is meeting an operational need. An employer
is most likely to show the unavailability of race-neutral alternatives
when race-conscious decisions are made for authenticity, such as

334. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481
(1986).
335. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 174–78 (1987) (“Not only was the
immediate promotion of blacks to the rank of corporal essential, but, if the need for
continuing judicial oversight was to end, it was also essential that the Department be
required to develop a procedure without adverse impact on blacks, and that the
effect of past delays be eliminated.”).
336. Id. at 171; Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 481.
337. The firefighters in Ricci were required to purchase their own test materials,
which cost approximately $500. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (2009).
338. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (suggesting training as an alternative).
339. See id. at 510 (suggesting financial aid as an alternative). In Griggs, the
employer funded two-thirds of the tuition costs for high school training. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
340. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (discussing the benefits of
diversity in the educational context, such as breaking down racial stereotypes,
fostering empathy and understanding for those of different races, encouraging
livelier class room discussion, and preparing students for diverse workforces).
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conducting investigations to infiltrate a racial gang, as Justice Stevens
341
has contemplated.
This discussion is not meant to suggest that there are easy cures for
the ills that the disparate impact provision’s racial classifications are
meant to address. But there must be evidence that the government
has considered alternatives before imposing the provision’s racial
classifications on employers.
VIII. THE SURVIVAL OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT PROVISION
The survival of the disparate impact provision against an Equal
Protection Clause challenge rests upon whether the provision’s use of
racial classifications functions like rigid quotas, is flexible and affords
individualized decisions, is overinclusive or underinclusive, is
temporary in duration, and is necessary in light of good faith
considerations of race-neutral alternatives. The disparate impact
provision fails the narrow tailoring requirement under all these
criteria.
The provision’s four-fifths rule risks being labeled a quota.
Legislative history reveals that the predominant concern with the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which codified disparate impact and its
342
predecessor, was this very issue of the Act being a “quota bill.” The
analysis in this Article does not rely on those generalized fears
expressed during the passage of the Act but rather on the
functionality of the four-fifths rule that was overlooked during the
two years of debates preceding the Act. It is difficult to distinguish
the four-fifths rule from a quota because it effectively insulates a
percentage of applicants from competition and uses race as the only
factor in determining prima facie violations, which is antithetical to
the characteristics of the permissible goal in Grutter.
If the disparate impact provision is a quota, it will naturally fail the
requirement for flexibility or individualized decisions that the Court
has favored as permissible goals. The provision lacks the flexibility of
the goals in Grutter, Paradise, Sheet Metal Workers, and Harvard’s
program that was endorsed by Bakke. The provision, specifically the
four-fifths rule, does not fluctuate with the needs of the employer or

341. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The Fifth Circuit has approved of using race as a basis of assignment for
undercover agents. See Perez v. FBI, 707 F. Supp. 891, 912 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d
956 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that “Title VII may not prohibit the Bureau
from assigning Hispanic Special Agents to undercover work in disproportionate
numbers”).
342. 137 CONG. REC. 30633 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli).

NGOV.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

2/24/2011 5:39 PM

WHEN THE “EVIL DAY” COMES

587

the compelling interest sought to be achieved by the provision.
Whether the objective of the provision is to remedy past
discrimination, smoke out discrimination, increase diversity, provide
role models, meet an operational need, or eliminate unnecessary and
arbitrary barriers to employment, the four-fifths rule is constant.
The provision’s inflexibility affects its ability to provide the type of
individualized decisions that were critical in the Court’s approval of
Grutter and invalidation of Gratz. Whether a plaintiff has a prima
facie case of disparate impact against an employer is determined on
the basis of race alone and does not include a “holistic” review of the
case.
Additionally, the provision is not narrowly tailored in duration or
scope. Regardless of the compelling interest that may justify racial
classifications, the Court has insisted that such classifications be
temporary. The disparate impact provision does not provide sunset
provisions or indicate “a logical stopping point.”
The provision’s four-fifths rule also potentially suffers from being
overinclusive and underinclusive, which affects evaluation of its
scope. Assuming that researchers took into consideration the fourfifths rule’s allowance for sample size and statistical significance, the
rule’s susceptibility to false positive and false negative errors could
lead to under-enforcement of the provision when an adverse impact
exists and over-enforcement when an adverse impact does not exist.
Governmental racial classifications that are overinclusive or
underinclusive undermine the necessity of the classifications and
suggest that other alternatives are available.
Finally, the provision’s racial classifications must be necessary to
achieving its compelling interest, which depends on consideration of
race-neutral alternatives. Of the six compelling interests identified
earlier, only in one circumstance would the provision’s racial
classifications be necessary to achieve its objective. If there is a
compelling need to use racial classifications for authenticity such as
for investigative purposes, race-neutral alternatives would not be
available. The availability of race-neutral alternatives for the other
possible compelling interests would negate the disparate impact
provision’s justified reliance upon racial classifications.
CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia warned in Ricci that “the war between disparate
impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it
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behooves us to begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to
343
make peace between them.” The purpose of this Article has been
to analyze the disparate impact provision under the doctrinal
demands of strict scrutiny and equal protection to determine if peace
is possible, rather than to predict the outcome of future cases or
make normative arguments.
In my earlier work, I explored the compelling interests that might
justify the disparate impact provision’s racial classifications.
I preliminarily concluded that the removal of barriers to achieve
equal employment opportunities is the most promising compelling
interest that might bring peace between the disparate impact
344
provision and the Equal Protection Clause. This Article completes
the analysis necessary to answer the question posed by Justice Scalia
by addressing the second prong of strict scrutiny—narrow tailoring.
While remedying past discrimination, smoking out discrimination,
enhancing diversity, providing role models, satisfying operational
need, and providing equal employment opportunities may be
laudable goals, the disparate impact provision’s means of achieving
them are inadequate to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. An
inability to show that the disparate impact provision’s means fit its
ends may, in fact, be fatal when “the evil day” comes.

343. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
344. See Ngov, supra note 19, at 89.

